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French version |
The issues from 1 to 148 are also available on line at NUMDAM and at Revues.org for the following issues |
- Results for criterions:
- Author: TCHANTCHO Bertrand
2 matches
| Title | A note on the manipulation of social choice correspondences |
| Author | TCHANTCHO Bertrand, DIFFO LAMBO Lawrence |
| Keywords | Linked domain, Manipulation, Non manipulable, p-social choice correspondence |
| Topics | Combinatorics, Decision Theory, Game Theory, Social choice, Voting |
| Abstract | We study the manipulability of social choice rules which select a fixed number of candidates for any given profile of preferences. Using a recent generalization by Aswal et al [2003] of the well known Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite [1975] theorem, we show (under the mild condition of unanimity) such rules are strategy proof only if they are dictatorial. |
| Number | 186, Summer 2009 |
| Language |  English |
| Title | The measured power and the elector's capacity of influencing the voting outcome |
| Author | DIFFO LAMBO Lawrence, TCHANTCHO Bertrand, MOULEN Joël |
| Keywords | Influence relation, Performance relation, Power indices, Power relation, Simple game |
| Topics | Game Theory, Orders and preorders, Social Choice, Voting |
| Abstract | We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor's influence relation ≥ T appraises the voter's capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendal's distance is the means of measuring a voter's dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition of ≥P is extended in two directions: on the one hand, dissatisfaction is measured by any distance (apart from the Kendal's distance), and on the other hand, the domain of individual preference relations has no restriction (it may contain complete weak orders apart from complete linear orders). The above mentioned result on ≥ T now being at times wrong, we come out with a sufficient condition under which ≥ T actually appraises the voter's capacity of influencing the voting outcome. Moreover we succeed, thanks to this highly unifying condition, in generalizing all the other results of [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000]. |
| Number | 166, Summer 2004 |
| Language | French |
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