Luciana Fiorini

Assistant Professor Luciana Fiorini joined the University of Western Australia in July of 2011, after working at Tulane University (USA) for four years. Her research in Economic Theory focuses on modeling market imperfections and asymmetry of information using a General Equilibrium approach. Luciana is also interested in applications of Game Theory.


Expectational stability in aggregative games

Greqam-AMSE Eco-Lunch Seminar

Using the replacement function associated with aggregative games, we analyze the expectational dynamics of the aggregate strategy of the game. We can interpret the Nash equilibrium of the game as the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of the system, and we examine the expectational stability of the REE. We characterize local stability in terms of fundamentals and the REE itself. We illustrate the results through well-known aggregative games (Cournot games, Bertrand competition with differentiated goods, rent seeking games, and the public goods provision game) and analyze their global expectational dynamics.

  • Amphithéâtre, Université d'Aix-Marseille - AMSE-GREQAM - 5 Boulevard Bourdet - CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille cedex 01

The Opportunity Criterion and Wellbeing

Wellbeing and Justice in the Social Sciences

We present the opportunity citerion as presented by Robert Sugden and will discuss the challenges and limits of this criterion of evaluating welfare in the light of people’s  seemingly inconsitent choices. 

  • EHESS, Centre de la Vieille-Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13002 Marseille

The Opportunity Criterion: An Axiomatic Approach

Paris School of Economics - Behavioral Seminar

We discuss the evaluation of market efficiency in situations where consumers have inconsistent preferences. In particular, we focus on the discussion started by Sugden (AER, 2004) in which he argues that markets are good because they satisfy the opportunity criterion, i.e. they offer opportunities that people expect to be able to take up if they so wish. We comment on the Robert Sugden's (AER, 2004) proposal of the “opportunity criterion”. We show that the opportunity criterion is not as widely applicable as the Pareto criterion, in particular because it also holds in situations in which the set of opportunities of some individuals can be expanded without reducing the set of others. We also discuss the alternative criterion presented by McQuillin and Sugden (SCW, 2012). Finally, we present an axiomatic approach to address the issues that we raise.

How to evaluate welfare with inconsistent preferences ?

Philosophie économie économique

  • Amphithéâtre, Université d'Aix-Marseille - AMSE-GREQAM - 5 Boulevard Bourdet - CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille cedex 01