Mobilizations, Solidarities, Engagements: 

*European societies in the Russian-Ukrainian war*

Many observers have argued that the Ukrainian resilience confronted as it is with the Russian aggression relies not only on the country’s, though admittedly limited, military capabilities, but also on the mobilization of its entire society. Since the Russian military intervention in 2014, which has ever since been a defining feature in the political and social transformation of post-revolutionary Ukraine, this mobilization has relied on the engagement of large sections of the society to support the frontline, organize supplies, welcome displaced persons, assist the state in its missions, as well as maintain and restore critical infrastructure. The role of women appears key here. After the invasion launched on 24 February 2022, the "home front" mobilized has expanded across much wider sections of European societies. In addition to the Ukrainian diaspora, many European citizens have stepped forward, for a wide variety of reasons, to show their engagement by participating in demonstrations and protests in support of Ukraine, providing, financially and materially, supplies and weapons to Ukrainians, but also by documenting Russian war crimes, preserving the cultural heritage or Ukrainian archives… Hundreds of thousands of them have opened their homes to refugees. In most countries, this mobilization of civil societies has been decisive, at a time when many States lack either the resources or the political resolve to respond to all the challenges posed by the war to their societies. These very local and decentralized forms of solidarity frequently make use of social networks. They have been able to rely on institutions - ranging from universities to churches – civil society organizations, already existing networks, but they have also given rise to new solidarities and forms of collective action.

How do these mobilizations reconfigure the experiences and the memory of earlier civil mobilizations and solidarities? What repertoires (political, memorial, humanitarian, etc.), both old and new, make sense of this collective action that is both local and transnational? How do these mobilizations fit into the longer history of civil mobilization in post-socialist countries? How do they in turn transform European societies and political landscapes?
Traces of memory: cities between empires and nations

In view of the threats the city of Odessa has been facing since the outbreak of the war, the World Heritage Committee resorted to an emergency procedure, in January 2023, by inscribing the city's historic centre on the World Heritage in Danger list. In December 2022, the monument to Empress Catherine the Great was promptly removed from public display in Odessa as part of Ukraine's efforts to purge its public spaces of traces of Russian influence. The statue was erected in 1900, 104 years after the death of Catherine II, taken down by the Soviets in 1920 and then reinstalled in its current location in 2007 by the city authorities.

These two developments, which occurred almost concurrently, bear witness to the ongoing conflicts in the construction and reconstruction of memories in urban territories. Although these phenomena are unfolding at an extremely fast pace in Ukrainian cities in the wake of the Russian invasion, similar trends can be observed throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

The issues of disputed territories, today's patterns of patrimonialization, the new wave of reconstruction (both of monuments and buildings), the consequences of urbanicides as well as the comparative history of memorial spaces have already been addressed in the previous two-day conference held in October 2022. This session will explore these issues in more depth by reviewing more examples from Ukraine and the region.

This session will therefore discuss a series of questions related to disputed urban memorial spaces in Central and Eastern Europe by means of examples and practices observed in present-day Ukraine: how to comprehend and interpret the destruction of monuments, buildings and cities as a result of war and political change? Who are the main actors in the re-manipulation of urban memory and what is the public reception of their actions? What are the distinctive features of the Ukrainian cases and how do they align with similar mechanisms in Eastern Europe? What are the main ideological references in the destruction and reconstruction of 'sites of memory', what is the role of past empires, mainly the Russian Empire, and how do we account for today's national constructions through the prism of such changes?
Ukraine, for its being invaded by Russia, has rallied the support of the vast majority of European countries and their public opinions. However, this should not make us ignore that a certain number of governmental, political and civil society actors, public intellectuals and European citizens do not endorse this stance. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Moldavia, Greece, Italy and France, discourses, mobilizations and other concrete practices are critical of or frankly diverge from the mainstream attitude by upholding or echoing the Russian propaganda. In contrast, a significant part of the Russian communities in exile in Europe show their support for Ukraine and resist the pro-invasion ideology.

First of all, this panel aims to analyse the pro-invasion discourses and practices that have emerged since 24 February 2022.

- The purpose will be to track the different occurrences, the types of actors involved and the practical forms of these discourses, along two main axes: the updating, in the context of the war, of the political and partisan affinities (radical right-wing parties, radical left-wing parties, heads of government allied) that existed prior to the war between certain governments and political parties and Vladimir Putin himself or his party. How do they position themselves vis-à-vis the war? To what political and semantic readjustments have these repositionings given birth? What are the mechanisms that maintain the proximity between foreign governments and the Russian government or, on the contrary, that cause a manifest breakdown? How are pro-Russian political networks being maintained or even strengthened in the context of the war?

- The tools and contents mobilized for the purpose of persuasion by the channels of Russian propaganda will be examined. How pro-Russian media outlets in Europe (the news channel RT and the news agency Sputnik, in particular) have mobilized to legitimize the Russian aggression and have responded to their being banned from the European Union; how the Russian authorities have also relied on their diplomatic apparatus, a nebulous network of organizations and groups, and an army of trolls in order to give credibility to their 'special military operation' against Ukraine. In addition to the propaganda devices, the narratives deployed deserve particular attention, in order to account for the multiple semantic strategies whereby the discourses are adjusted to the intended targets, with the Russian authorities developing different discourses aimed at various audiences internationally, such as the instrumentalization of the energy crisis.

The panel will also examine the attitudes, perceptions and even forms of mobilization of Russian communities in Europe.

- The Russian propaganda labels them traitors and several hundred thousand Russian citizens have fled into exile, both the countries neighbouring the Russian Federation and in the heart of Europe. The "new dissidents", whether they are journalists, academics, artists or members of civil society organizations such as Memorial, represent, in their diversity, an elite of refugees who have openly taken a stand against the current Russian regime by departing. Besides, what are their modes of engagement and politicization, and how are the former militant collectives being reconfigured? The repertoire of actions and mobilizations is quite broad, and includes the emergence of critical
voices denouncing the authoritarianism of the Russian government on the European public stage, the establishment of forms of counter-propaganda and information networks targeting the Russian society, active interventions in support of Ukrainians, whether in Ukraine or in exile, and synergies deployed on the scale of collectives of exiled Russian citizens aiming at the organization of a new diaspora huddled around the main refugees centres.

- This recent exile superimposes itself on the immigrant communities that have blossomed in the three decades since the collapse of the USSR, and which are present in a variety of traits in different European countries, most notably in Germany. To what extent do the newly arrived refugees benefit from specific support and resources provided by these communities, and to what extent does their presence make more noticeable and explicit the existence within these communities of movements supporting the Russian government and assisting Russian aggression, in particular by promoting a series of pro-invasion narratives?
The economic dimensions of the war in Ukraine have only intensified the complexity and the tragic character of the event. The physical and material destruction (infrastructure, factories, cities...), the damage to the demographic capital, the loss of human capital due to the difficulties in maintaining secondary and university education for an age group are some of the long-term consequences of the conflict that broke out on 24 February 2022.

**What is a war economy in the Europe of today?**

The reduction of the Ukrainian GDP by 30 to 50% in 2022, the metamorphosis of a civil economy into a war economy with the repercussions on the behaviour of economic agents (changes in property assets, relocation of capital abroad, black market), the financing of production, salaries (including those of the combatants), and changes in the standard of living of the Ukrainian people, have raised issues that European countries have not faced since 1945. What role did the state play in this context (regulation, taxation, monetary intervention policy and financing of the public deficit, control of capital movements, fight against endemic corruption facilitated by the war, etc.)?

**The economic impact of the war in Central and Eastern Europe**

How have the new economic conditions affecting Ukraine impacted the neighbouring countries, members of the European Union (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania)? How has Moldova, squeezed between the EU and Ukraine, been affected? In this respect, two problems stand out: the economic impact provoked by the wave of Ukrainian refugees on these countries and the new economic and logistical links that are being hastily established - with the help of the EU - between Ukraine and its western neighbours against the backdrop of the collapse of Ukrainian exports, particularly cereals.

The physical, psychological and economic hardships of millions of Ukrainian refugees who migrated through or settled down in neighbouring European countries constitute - along with humanitarian aid and its own economy - a specific chapter in the history of this tragedy. Shortages, survival practices, caretaking and humanitarian economy in action, insertion of individuals in new economic environments are all aspects to be highlighted in the history of the greatest humanitarian disaster that Europe has known since the Second World War.

Finally, the new economic and logistical connections built, under emergency conditions, between Ukraine and its neighbours in order to circumvent the Russian blockade of Ukrainian exports represent, also at the level of a microhistory of economic interactions at the various western borders of Ukraine, a field of study that needs to be more accurately defined and explored. A case in point is the issue of the circulation of grain, which was severely hampered by the Russian military presence, both for the transportation of cereals from the interior to the harbours and for the trade routes in the Black Sea.