PRACTICAL INFORMATION

Conference Venue

All talks will take place at the EHESS, which is located on 105 Boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris. Here is a map of the location.

Transportation

Metro: line 4, Saint-Placide; line 12, Notre-Dame-des-Champs.
RER: 15 minutes walk from the RER B, Luxembourg.
Bus: 89, 94, 95, 96, stop Rennes St Placide; 58, 68, 82, stop Notre Dame des Champs.
Airports: Charles de Gaulle and Roissy Airport are both accessible with the RER B.
For more information, please consult the RATP website (www.ratp.fr).

Accessibility

The venue is wheelchair accessible, with an elevator for upper floors with Braille and vocal commands. The amphithéâtre Furet has two spots for wheelchairs, which can be accessed by the entrance on the first floor.
There are accessible bathrooms on every floor.
Parking possibilities may be arranged.
This conference has been sponsored and funded by the following agencies and institutions:

- European Epistemology Network
- Institut d’Études de la Cognition at ENS (Program New Ideas in Mathematical Philosophy)
- CRAL at EHESS (Centre de Recherches sur les Arts et le Langage)
- Philosophy Department at the ENS Ulm

European Epistemology Network

The European Epistemology Network (EEN) was brought into existence by some of the leading researchers in the theory of knowledge who now constitute the Steering Committee of the EEN. It provides a platform for cooperation and exchange among epistemologists and those interested in the theory of knowledge in Europe.

Steering Committee:

- Annalisa Coliva  
  (UC Irvine / University of Modena)  
- Igor Douven  
  (Sorbonne University)  
- Paul Égré  
  (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)  
- Pascal Engel  
  (EHESS, Paris)  
- Klemens Kappel  
  (University of Copenhagen)  
- Christoph Kelp  
  (KU Leuven)  
- Erik Olsson  
  (University of Lund)  
- Duncan Pritchard  
  (University of Edinburgh)  
- Rene van Woudenberg  
  (University of Amsterdam)

Website:

http://www.epistemologynetwork.com/
## COMMITTEES

### Conference Organizers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Égré</td>
<td>Institut Jean Nicod, Paris</td>
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<td>EHESS, Paris</td>
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<td>Igor Douven</td>
<td>Sorbonne University</td>
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### Local Organizing Committee

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sophie Bilardello</td>
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<td>Samira Boujidi</td>
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<td>Igor Douven</td>
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<td>Clémentine Fourrier</td>
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<td>Jamila Meliani</td>
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<td>Patricia Mirabile</td>
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### Scientific Committee

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<td>Carla Bagnoli</td>
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<td>Mikkel Gerken</td>
<td>University of Copenhagen</td>
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  miloud.belkoniene@unifr.ch
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  mb938@cam.ac.uk
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• Luca Zanetti, Institute for Advanced Studies of Pavia, 59 luca.zanetti@iusspavia.it
• Paweł Zięba, Jagiellonian University, 59 pawelek.zieba@uj.edu.pl
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Chair(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:10</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
<td>Welcome / Registration</td>
<td>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET - KEYNOTE SPEECH</td>
<td>Claudine TIERCELIN - Are skills dispositions to know? Chair: P. Égré</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30</td>
<td>Parallel 1</td>
<td>Room 1: Sensitivity</td>
<td>M. Blome-Tillman, Sensitivity Actually</td>
<td>P. Engel</td>
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<td>10:30</td>
<td>Parallel 1</td>
<td>Room 2: Evidence</td>
<td>C. Piller, Evidentialism - For and Against</td>
<td>R. van Woudenberg</td>
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<td>10:30</td>
<td>Parallel 1</td>
<td>Room 3: Fallibilism</td>
<td>A. Davies, A defense of infallibilism</td>
<td>A. Coliva</td>
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<td>10:30</td>
<td>Parallel 1</td>
<td>Amphi Furet: Assertion</td>
<td>M. Jope, Belief and Assertion: A common epistemic Norm?</td>
<td>M. Kappel</td>
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<td>11:25</td>
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<td>S. Gaus, Sensitivity and Necessity</td>
<td>J. Gao, Occurrent Belief and Dispositional Belief</td>
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<td>A. Logins, Necessary truths, knowledge, and E=K</td>
<td>A. Gaultier, Justification, truth-conduciveness and the New Evil Demon problem</td>
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<td>Parallel Session 3</td>
<td>P. Dimmock, Fallible Knowledge: New Ways to talk about an old problem</td>
<td>J. de Greffe, On a Puzzle for Anti-Luck Epistemology</td>
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<td>12:05</td>
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<td>A. McKenna, R. McKenna</td>
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<td>J. de Greffe, On a Puzzle for Anti-Luck Epistemology</td>
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<td>M. Simion, Knowledge-First functionalism</td>
<td>J.M. Chevalier, On the Fittingness Theory of Reasoning</td>
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<td>P. Brössel, From Perception to Belief</td>
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<td>13:10</td>
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<td>A. Soria-Ruiz, MacFarlane’s Challenge Against Epistemic Expressivism: A Response</td>
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<td>Parallel 1</td>
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<td>A. Tucker, The generation of knowledge from memories</td>
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<td>13:10</td>
<td>Parallel 1</td>
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<td>M. Daoust, Are There Plausible Cases of Interpersonal Epistemic Permissiveness?</td>
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* NB: Version as of May, 30. Possible updates pending.
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET</th>
<th>René VAN WOUDENBERG - An Epistemological Critique of Scientism</th>
<th>Chair: K. Kappel</th>
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<td>9:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET</td>
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<td>10:30 - 10:45</td>
<td>Breakfast: Room 4</td>
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<td>10:30 - 11:00</td>
<td>Room 1: Suspension of Judgment</td>
<td>A. Giustina, P. Zięba, A-M. Eder, T. Raleigh, M. Belkoniene, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>10:30 - 11:00</td>
<td>Room 2: Knowledge First</td>
<td>C. Kelp, P. Zięba, A-M. Eder, T. Raleigh, M. Belkoniene, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>10:30 - 11:00</td>
<td>Room 3: Testimony</td>
<td>P. Dennis, S. Wright, A-M. Eder, T. Raleigh, M. Belkoniene, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>11:25 - 12:05</td>
<td>Amphi Furet: Scepticism</td>
<td>N. Kloosterboer, S. Wright, T. Raleigh, M. Belkoniene, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET</td>
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<td>12:10 - 13:10</td>
<td>KEYNOTE SPEECH</td>
<td>Ulrike HAHN - Rational Argument: from normative to descriptive considerations and back</td>
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<td>13:10 - 15:00</td>
<td>Room 1: Explanation</td>
<td>P. Brössel, N. Ashton, M. Belkoniene, I. Lawler, M. Fürst, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>13:10 - 15:00</td>
<td>Room 2: Structure of Justification</td>
<td>B. Gaultier, N. Ashton, M. Belkoniene, I. Lawler, M. Fürst, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>13:10 - 15:00</td>
<td>Room 3: Norms of belief assertion</td>
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<td>15:00 - 16:00</td>
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<td>15:00 - 16:00</td>
<td>Amphi Furet: Degrees of belief</td>
<td>E. Olsson, N. Ashton, M. Belkoniene, I. Lawler, M. Fürst, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>16:00 - 17:00</td>
<td>Room 1: Implicit Belief</td>
<td>P. Brössel, M. Ashton, M. Belkoniene, I. Lawler, M. Fürst, M. Fürst</td>
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<td>16:00 - 17:00</td>
<td>Room 2: Structure of Understanding</td>
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### July 6, 2016 (Wednesday)

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<td>9:30-10:30</td>
<td><strong>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET</strong>&lt;br&gt;I. DOUVEN-M. GERKEN-U. HAHN - Round table on Epistemology and Cognitive Psychology&lt;br&gt;Chair: P. Égré</td>
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<td>10:30-10:45</td>
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<td>10:45-11:25</td>
<td><strong>Room 1:</strong> Entitlement&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 2:</strong> Self-knowledge&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 3:</strong> Social aspects of knowledge&lt;br&gt;<strong>Amphi Furet:</strong> Scepticism&lt;br&gt;Chair: P. Mirabile&lt;br&gt;A. Logins&lt;br&gt;J.-M. Chevalier&lt;br&gt;A.-M. Eder</td>
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<td>12:10-13:10</td>
<td><strong>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET</strong>&lt;br&gt;Annalisa COLIVA – The Varieties of Self-Knowledge&lt;br&gt;Chair: M. Gerken</td>
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<td>15:00-15:40</td>
<td><strong>Room 1:</strong> Justification&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 2:</strong> Self-knowledge&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 3:</strong> Aggregation of Beliefs&lt;br&gt;<strong>Amphi Furet:</strong> Blameworthiness&lt;br&gt;Chair: H. Rott&lt;br&gt;J. Dutant&lt;br&gt;U. Hahn&lt;br&gt;B. Icard</td>
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<td>16:35-17:15</td>
<td><strong>Room 1:</strong> Inference&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 2:</strong> Realism&lt;br&gt;<strong>Room 3:</strong> Social Epistemology&lt;br&gt;<strong>Amphi Furet:</strong> Blameworthiness&lt;br&gt;Chair: H. Rott&lt;br&gt;P. Armary&lt;br&gt;U. Hahn&lt;br&gt;B. Icard</td>
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<td>17:20-18:20</td>
<td><strong>AMPHITHÉÂTRE F. FURET – KEYNOTE SPEECH</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sanford GOLDBERG – Assertion, Silence, and the norms of public reaction&lt;br&gt;Chair: P. Engel</td>
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KEYNOTES

How to be an infallibilist
Julien Dutant, UCL London

To be an infallibilist is to think that knowing requires that in some suitable sense one could not have been mistaken. To be a dogmatic infallibilist is to be an infallibilist who thinks that we know a lot. Dogmatic infallibilism is widely thought to face three objections. The conceptual objection is that knowledge does not require infallibility. The normative objection is that infallibilism sanctions deeply irrational attitudes and actions. The empirical objection is that we are not infallible in the required sense. This paper defends dogmatic infallibilism against all three.

Assertion, Silence, and the norms of public reaction
Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University

In this paper I argue that there is a presumptive (albeit defeasible) entitlement for participants in a conversation to assume that a hearer’s silence in the face of an observed assertion indicates acceptance. I argue for this on the basis of considerations pertaining to our actual practices with assertion, together with considerations pertaining to the normative dimensions of that practice (deriving from Stalnaker’s account of the “essential effect” of assertion). One result of my thesis is that in contexts in which a hearer is known or observed to have observed an assertion, she is under prima facie normative pressure, if she rejects the assertion, to signal having done so. After defending these claims, I address the variety of contexts in which the entitlement itself is defeated (including but not limited to conditions of “silencing”).

Rational argument: From Normative to Descriptive Considerations and Back
Ulrike Hahn, Birkbeck, University of London

The talk describes work on rational argument, in particular on fallacies of argumentation, to exemplify the interplay between normative and descriptive considerations in psychological work. In so doing, it also seeks to highlight the specific benefits of designing and conducting behavioural experiments even for researchers interested primarily in normative issues.

Are skills dispositions to know?
Claudine Tiercelin, Collège de France

In a common attempt to lend proper significance to the concept of skill in philosophy and, possibly, to confer their own intellectualist analysis of know how in terms of propositional knowledge heavily relying on the concept of practical modes of presentation, J. Stanley and T. Williamson have recently argued that skills should be taken more into account and should be viewed, basically, as dispositions to know. Although I agree with many aspects of their analyses, think they offer rather convincing replies to some anti-intellectualist objections, and provide a better view of skills than other suggestions that have been made, e.g. in terms of competences or in viewing ‘practical modes of presentation’ as Fregean ‘practical senses’, I shall underline some difficulties in their position and suggest some ways of solving them, as far as three major issues are concerned: by paying more attention to some important logical and metaphysical difficulties related to the concept of disposition itself; by drawing a more careful distinction - especially needed if one favors an intellectualist standpoint - between skills and intellectual virtues (something we learnt both from Aristotle and from Ryle); by introducing some changes not so much to our conception of know how as to our concept of propositional knowledge itself.
PLENARY TALKS

The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
Annalisa Coliva, University of California Irvine / University of Modena

The primary aim of the paper is to present a pluralistic framework about self-knowledge – that is to say, about the way in which human beings know their own mental states. The secondary aim of the paper is therefore to oppose monism both in the form of a denial of the plurality of ways in which we know our own minds, and in the form of chauvinism, according to which, although human beings do know their own minds in a plurality of ways, only a selected class of those is deemed of philosophical significance. Examples of either kind of monism are widespread in the literature and some prominent specimens will be reviewed.

Is epistemology a normative guide to the empirical study of folk epistemology?
Mikkel Gerken, University of Edinburgh

I will discuss some methodological issues from my book-in-progress (“On Folk Epistemology”). I begin by presenting some experimental findings revealing certain surprising patterns of knowledge ascriptions which challenge orthodox epistemological theory. Epistemic Panglossians argue that we should therefore revise epistemological theory. In contrast, Epistemic Meliorists argue that the discrepancy between epistemological theory and patterns of folk knowledge ascriptions reveals a cognitive bias in the latter. In this regard the debate resembles the rationality debates concerning reasoning. However, a major asymmetry pertains to the status of rules of reasoning (e.g., inference rules of logic, Bayesian theorems) and epistemological principles. I discuss this asymmetry, the consequences for the empirical study of folk epistemology. If time permits, I will discuss the special case of pragmatic encroachment.

A Diachronic Perspective on Peer Disagreement
Erik J. Olsson, Lund University

The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation rather than armchair philosophy. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. As a remedy, I introduce an alternative (Bayesian) simulation framework, Laputa, inspired by Alvin Goldman’s seminal work on veritistic social epistemology. I show that Christensen’s conciliatory response, reasonably supplemented, gives rise to an increase in epistemic (veritistic) value only if the peers continue to recheck their mental math; else the peers might as well be steadfast.

Against stability
Hans Rott, Universität Regensburg

An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two recent stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational belief. ‘Stability’ is an ambiguous term that has an internally conditional structure.
An Epistemological Critique of Scientism  
Rene van Woudenberg, Vrije Universiteit

In this paper I discuss two views that have been labeled by their respective authors as "scientism". First I discuss Alex Rosenberg's scientism—roughly the view that only science can give us knowledge. I will argue that some elementary epistemological reflection shows this position to be untenable. James Ladyman's & Don Ross's scientism is much more sophisticated. I will argue, however, that the crucial principles of this position, the Principle of Naturalistic Closure, as well as the Principle of the Primacy of Physics, are problematic. I conclude with the presentation of a non-scientistic modest view on the relation between science and knowledge.
CONTRIBUTED TALKS

Does Epistemic Constitutivism Guarantee Epistemic Relativism?
Natalie Alana Ashton, University of Vienna

Annalisa Coliva (2015) has recently defended a view of the structure of justification on which (a) beliefs can only be justified in conjunction with very general, unwarranted assumptions (such as ‘there is an external world’), and (b) these very general unwarranted assumptions constitute epistemic rationality. If epistemic relativism is taken to be the view that there are, or could be, multiple sets of incompatible assumptions which are equally valid, then Coliva’s constitutivist account may look prone to epistemic relativism. This is because Coliva argues for a set of basic assumptions which constitute epistemic rationality and cannot be warranted, and so are presumably equal to any other set of basic assumptions that could exist. The only additional ingredient required to turn this account into relativism is (the possibility of) a rival set of basic assumptions.

In this paper, I will consider Coliva’s arguments against those who think that her account is relativist - she concludes that other basic sets of assumptions are all either not possible, or not incompatible with our own - and suggest that these are inadequate. I will do this in two stages. First, I will counter the suggestion that alternative sets of basic assumptions are not possible by questioning some of the moves Coliva makes, e.g. about the content of perception. Second, I will offer a counter example to Coliva’s claim that such sets of assumptions are not incompatible with our own. From this I will conclude that Coliva has not completely ruled out the possibility of rival, equally valid sets of basic assumptions, and so her argument that her view is not relativist is unconvincing.

However, in the final section of this paper I will also attempt to ‘soften the blow’ of relativism for those tempted by constitutivism about rationality, by briefly sketching out the key properties of justification that epistemologists (e.g. Boghossian 2006, Pritchard 2016) have worried will be lost on a relativist view, and showing that they could all, with a little work, still be attained on relativist version of constitutivism. In doing so, I will show that Coliva’s account can provides a plausible picture of the structure of justification even if it is prone to epistemic relativism.

REFERENCES

Explanimation and Truthlike Explanations
Miloud Belkoniene, University of Fribourg

Since Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2008) first proposed their version of explanationism concerning the relation of evidential support, there has been a gain of interest among proponents of evidentialism for such accounts. The first part of this talk will consist of a presentation of what I take to be a serious issue for explanationist accounts of evidential support. This issue concerns the possible collapse of explanationism into what Conee and Feldman call proportionality. As I intend to show, this collapse depends crucially on the way inference to the best explanation (IBE) is understood. In the second part of this talk, I will propose a possible understanding of IBE which prevents explanationism from collapsing into proportionality and spell out some desiderata for future work.

According to explanationist accounts of evidential support, someone’s beliefs are supported by one’s evidences in virtue of principles of best explanation. One’s evidences support the belief that P when P is identified as being part of the best available explanation of why one has these evidences. On the other hand, according to proportionalist accounts of evidential support, someone’s evidences support one’s beliefs in virtue of the probabilistic relations they bear to their content.

Gregory Stoutenburg (2015) recently underlined a possible collapse of explanationism into proportionality, focusing on responses proposed by Kevin McCain (2014a, 2014b) to Ryan Byerly’s (2013, 2015) worries concerning explanationism. In my view, such a collapse is independent of the McCain – Byerly exchange and depends on the way IBE is understood.
A popular way to conceive IBE consists in understanding it within a probabilistic framework. In Peter Lipton’s view (2004) for instance, IBE consists in identifying the explanation that provides the best understanding of what we wish to explain, in order to infer the most probable explanation of it. According to this understanding, IBE, if valid, consists in a heuristic that reveals the probabilistic relations existing between the explanans and the explanandum. Now, if IBE is understood this way, explanationism collapses into proportionalism, as evidential support ultimately rests on probabilistic relations between one’s evidences and one’s beliefs. IBE only consists in another way to reveal these relations.

In order to prevent such a collapse, proponents of explanationism need an alternative understanding of IBE. Theo Kuipers (1984, 2000, and 2004) proposes to understand this type of inferences as inferences to the most truthlike explanation. As truthlikeness differs importantly from the notion of epistemic probability involved in proportionalism, this understanding of IBE does not lead to the collapse of explanationism into proportionalism; explanatory virtues of the explanans are not simply another way to evaluate its epistemic probability but indicate its truthlikeness. However, such an understanding of IBE implies that proponents of explanationism elaborate the notion of truthlikeness in such a way that the relation between the truthlikeness of an explanation and the truth of a proposition which is part of it becomes salient.

REFERENCES

Sensitivity Actually  
Michael Blome-Tillman, University of Cambridge / McGill University

A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems” (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick (1981)). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for the defenders of sensitivity accounts. It is furthermore argued that attempts to modally strengthen traditional sensitivity accounts to avoid the problem must appeal to a notion of safety—the primary competitor of sensitivity in the literature. The paper concludes that the explanatory virtues of sensitivity accounts are largely illusory. In the framework of modal epistemology, it is safety rather than sensitivity that does the heavy explanatory lifting with respect to Gettier cases, lottery examples, and other pertinent cases.

Excusing Prospective Agents  
Cameron Boult, KU Leuven

Blameless norm violation is a central topic in debates about the norm of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning. Proponents of factive norms of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning are particularly interested in blameless norm violation because there are many interesting cases in which agents violate putative factive norms but are clearly blameless. An adequate account of such cases is important for challenging more traditional approaches to epistemic justification—for example, approaches that equate justification with a kind of blamelessness (see Alston 1988; Plantinga 1993; Steup 1999). A popular strategy in this respect is to draw a distinction between justifications and excuses, and to explain various norm-violating agents’ lack of justification in terms of excuses. One source of complexity for this project is the sheer
variety of cases of epistemic blamelessness. Consider a few familiar ones:

- the New Evil Demon victim,
- the Gettiered person,
- the person who is just unlucky,
- the member of a benighted community,
- the brainwashed person,
- the stroke victim.

Some authors have argued that we cannot appeal to excuses to make sense of the blamelessness of agents in all types of cases (Gerken 2011). Whatever story we want to tell about what it takes to deserve an excuse in a given situation, it will not apply across the board in a unified or non ad hoc way. This might be plausible. But a couple of things should be said regardless. First, in addition to excuses, there are other types of exculpatory defenses. For example, recent work on the topic focuses on “exemptions” in addition to excuses. Second, this recent work aims to understand excuses and their relationship to exemptions in a principled way, such that a unified account of the above cases looks hopeful (Littlejohn forthcoming; Williamson forthcoming).

In this talk, I examine an additional kind of case: blameless norm violation in young children. This phenomenon has not been examined in much detail in epistemology. But it is significant in the present context. As I explain, it is not clear that excuses or exemptions provide appropriate explanations of blameless violations of factive norms in this kind of case. To put it very briefly: excuses imply too much responsibility, while exemptions imply too little. Insofar as we are interested in defending factive epistemic norms, we need a more nuanced account of exculpatory defenses. In this talk, I put forward a positive account of blameless norm violation in young children. I call it the “Heuristic Model”. The basic idea behind the heuristic model is that excusing young children should be understood as part of a more general familiar practice. This is the practice of treating young children like adults. Perhaps the simplest example of this is when we speak to young children in sophisticated vocabularies, knowing that they do not understand everything we say. I will argue that doing so respects their “prospective agency”. It is a heuristic or method for training them into adult human agents. The idea behind the Heuristic Model is that appropriate exculpatory defenses of young children likewise respect their prospective agency.

REFERENCES

Group knowledge: aggregating a numerical comparison
Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Tilburg University

When an academic jury decides whether a candidate has passed an exam, or when an expert committee agrees that a medicine’s risk level is higher than the legal level, or when a group of friends chooses whether renting this holiday house
is worth it, a common structure is involved: a group of agents takes a binary decision by comparing two numerical quantities, one of which varies among agents and one which is fixed. For instance, experts agree on the maximum risk limit but they disagree on the medicine's risk assessment. The problem investigated in this paper is: how should the group aggregate the individual assessments, so as to reach a binary decision?

Among others, some simple rules come to mind: one may ask the agents to vote directly on the final decision (call this rule R_vote), or one may ask them to reveal first their numerical assessments, and then to compare the linear average to the fixed threshold (call it R_average). Cases arise in which these two rules give opposite group's decision: take again an expert committee who is instructed as follows: "Grant the authorization in case the risk of the product is lower than 5%" (on some appropriate scale). Suppose the committee is composed of three experts, two of whom assess the risk of the pesticide to be of 4%, while the third assesses it to be of 10%. With R_vote, the authorization is granted by two against one. With R_average, the group compares the average of their individual assessments, \((4 + 4 + 10)/3 = 6\%\), with 5%, and the authorization is denied. Which belief aggregation rule is the better one, and should be adopted by the committee? Is there a uniquely rational way to take aggregate beliefs and take a decision?

This is a new problem in belief aggregation, with links to decision theory. So far, the literature has only been concerned with judgment aggregation (for reviews, see List 2012 or Mongin 2014) or probability aggregation (for reviews, see Dietrich and List forthcoming, or Martini and Sprenger forthcoming). I shall argue that the former framework is unable to represent averages of numerical variables and to solve our problem, while the latter framework does not straightforwardly apply to numerical comparisons, and that its results (for instance AczéI and Wagner 1980, or McConway 1981) are insufficient to decide between R_vote and R_average. I argue that new axioms or desiderata for the right aggregation rule are needed. I suggest to consider several features against which the rule should be robust: the metrics employed, the level of detail in the formulation of the problem, the presence of extremist agents in the group, and the possibility of errors in agents' assessments.

Overall, I argue that these requirements make R_vote preferable to R_average. It thus gives an epistemic justification for the democratic rule, in addition to its usual procedural justification. The results also suggest that the broad picture of the decision making process should be taken into account from the start, to identify possible threshold comparisons.

REFERENCES

Form perception to belief
Peter Brössel (joint work with I. Douven), Ruhr University of Bochum and University of Pittsburgh

According to a traditional picture in epistemology and cognitive science, our senses provide the mind with raw perceptual experience without any conceptual content. Cognitive processes, then, work on the basis of those perceptual experiences. In particular, one part of this traditional picture is that various cognitive processes take the perceptual experience as input and interpret it to form perception based beliefs, predictions and memories, and to come to decisions based on the experience. Another part of this picture is that these cognitive processes or their outcomes cannot influence directly the content of our perceptual experience. With Pylyshyn (1980, 1999), we can say that perceptual experiences are cognitively impenetrable.

This traditional picture possesses many features that especially epistemologists but also cognitive scientists consider to be advantageous. More specifically, following Pylyshyn 1999 defenders of the picture distinguish between early and late vision: more specifically, between early and cognition-independent perceptual processes and
late recognitional processes which are essential only for categorizations tasks that work on the basis of the output of early vision. From an epistemic point of view this picture is desirable: there is one cognition independent part of perception (i.e., early vision) which serves as a basis for all recognition and categorization tasks. Being cognitively impenetrable, early vision can potentially serve as an epistemic fundament for the justification of perception-based beliefs. Early vision is independent of cognition and, thus, no epistemic circularity worries arise (Siegel 2011, Lyon 2011) and the output of early vision is certain to be non theory-laden (Hanson 1958; Kuhn 1962; Rafopoulos 2006, 2009).

What we need to understand the workings of the mind, specifically to understand how perception and cognition are intertwined, is an intelligible connection between the content of cognitive states like beliefs (whose content is propositional) and the low-level, phenomenal content of perceptual experiences. In particular, we need such an intelligible connection for the epistemic purpose of determining whether an agent is justified or rational in forming a belief in response to her perceptual experience. Suppose in response to the perceptual experience of dark clouds the agent directly forms the "perceptual" belief that God exists. Clearly, we would like to say that such a belief is unjustified and irrational. But on what grounds can we do so? Based on Gärdenfors’s (2000) Conceptual Spaces approach to model mental representation, we suggest an account of the non-propositional low-level content of perceptual experiences and the content of perceptual concepts and beliefs. Based on such an account one can investigate how one can justifiably or rationally infer beliefs from perceptual experiences. In particular, we provide a Bayesian framework to infer beliefs from non-propositional beliefs. The paper aims at presenting an outline of such an account. It is therefore that we will mostly concentrate on the perception of color, color concepts and beliefs about color. However, in passing we will also comment on the perception of shape and of movement of objects, and the respective concepts and beliefs.

On the Fittingness Theory of Reasoning

Jean-Marie Chevalier, Collège de France

I want to discuss a recent view of reasoning which defines reasoning as a revision of one’s attitudes (intentions, beliefs, etc.) aiming at fittingness. The supporters of this view [e.g. McHugh forthcoming; McHugh & Way 2014] argue that a good reasoning has a certain property, namely, not that of goodness, nor of being good for something else, but that of being good as reasoning. Such a property is what they call fittingness.

I first show where this thesis seems to come from. It seems that it was imported from a normative theory of beliefs according to which the norm of believing is not knowledge nor truth but fitting beliefs, i.e. a kind of fitting attitude. The so-called fitting theory of reasoning is then a transfer of such a view into a theory of reasoning.

I argue that such a property as fittingness is flawed to characterize a theory of reasoning.

At first, it may seem that fittingness is a useful category since it binds together both theoretical and practical reasoning. Truth is arguably not the aim of reasoning. It is often argued that validity is, but it raises a series of problems. For a start, while we often use incorrect reasonings, we would not necessarily recognize that invalid reasonings are bad reasonings (e.g. inductive inference). Another problem with holding validity to be the aim of reasoning is practical reasoning: it can be shown that it is more difficult to define the validity of an inference over intentions than over beliefs, and that it may not be the same notion of validity [Broome 2013]. For these and other reasons, validity may not generally be claimed to be the aim of reasoning.

Is fittingness a better candidate? I claim that the notion is too mysterious. It (at least implicitly) echoes evolutionary conceptions, which seems to be a strong point. But it does not precisely say how it can be related to evolution, so it shams an evolutionary approach.

Next, if fittingness is the true aim of reasoning, then for an agent to try to reach such an aim requires a sensibility to what fits. The fittingness theory of reasoning views it as dispositional. It claims that agents must be able to be sensitive to certain conditions without representing those conditions as
obtaining. I argue it is an elegant solution, since it avoids problems of regression or meta-level faced by many theories of reasoning (e.g. Boghossian, C. Wright, Broome). Resorting to fittingness seems to account for the possibly of following a rule without having the concept of such a rule or knowing this rule. However, the kind of disposition it is should be explained. What is the kind of sensibility to fittingness that is involved in such a picture? Inventing a mental faculty in order to make fittingness fit is far from economical.

After my critical part aimed at the fittingness theory of reasoning, I nevertheless try to salvage part of it, namely, the idea that it is a functional approach to reasoning, which may be an interesting hint. It is the constructive part I develop in the rest of my talk.

Are There Plausible Cases of Interpersonal Epistemic Permissiveness?
Marc-Kevin Daoust, Université de Montréal

Epistemic permissiveness raises the question whether rational agents are sometimes permitted, relative to the same body of evidence, (a) to believe that P, and (b) not to believe that P. At the interpersonal level, the issue is to determine whether it is possible, for two epistemically rational agents who share all evidence and have equal abilities and dispositions, to disagree on whether P. In that approach, there is an important constraint on the notion of epistemic peer. Not only should peers (1) have “similar” capacities and “more or less” the same relevant evidence, or (2) be “generally equally reliable in the domain in question” (Christensen 2011, 2): they should have equal capacities, and share all relevant evidence. That is a very demanding condition.

There are various arguments in favour of interpersonal epistemic permissiveness where it is assumed that two rational agents who disagree 1) have equal capacities and 2) share all relevant evidence (Douven 2009; Kelly 2010; Schoenfeld 2014). Here is a simple example from Gideon Rosen (2001, 71): “Paleontologists disagree about what killed the dinosaurs. And while it is possible that most of the parties to this dispute are irrational, this need not be the case”. Is it plausible to assume that,

in the previous example, paleontologists have exactly the same relevant evidence? Using the same example, Miriam Schoenfield thinks that it is plausible to assume that different paleontologists have the same body of evidence, and declares that: “(…) presumably, the evidence relevant to the question of who killed the dinosaurs is limited primarily to the facts paleontologists study in their academic lives” (Schoenfeld 2014, 196).

I will challenge the plausibility of this claim. In particular, this paper argues that it is extremely unlikely that two agents share the same relevant evidence. I will argue that the question of epistemic permissiveness has to be treated in radically different ways at the intrapersonal and interpersonal level. If the question of intrapersonal epistemic permissiveness relies on plausible assumptions, the question of interpersonal epistemic permissiveness relies on unrealistic and highly implausible assumptions. My argument can be summarized as follows:

1. Cases of rational peer disagreement presuppose that two agents share the same evidential set, and have equal cognitive capacities.
2. Two agents share the same evidential set and have equal cognitive capacities only if they:
   a) share some relevant experiences that inform their evidence weighing functions;
   b) share an information retention procedure, with similar patterns to make memories;
   c) share salient evidence, which frames how they understand a question and reach a conclusion about that question.
3. Except for identical copies of an agent (a doppelganger, for example), it is extremely unlikely that two agents will meet all the conditions listed above.
4. Since having an epistemic peer is extremely implausible, an agent almost never finds himself in a case of rational peer disagreement.

REFERENCES

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1 A significant part of this work was completed in close partnership with Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)

**A defence of infallibilism**

*Alex Davies, University of Tartu*

**Topic:** $P$ entails $Q$ if and only if there's no logically possible world such that $P$ is true and $Q$ is not. Infallibilism ($A$ knows that $P$ only if $A$'s evidence entails $P$) implies that most of what we believe is not knowledge because the under-determination thesis is plausible: for most $P$ which $A$ takes to be true, $A$'s evidence does not entail $P$. I explain how an infallibilist can reasonably reject the under-determination thesis.

**Paradigm Case:** A beaker (containing $c$ litres of water) sits under a tap. At 3pm the tap begins releasing water into the beaker at a constant rate of $k$ litres per minute. The tap runs for $t$ minutes. $y$ is the amount of water in the beaker at a given time. Suppose that the equation $y = kt + c$ describes an invariant relationship that persists between 3:00pm and 3:03pm. One's evidence consists of the values of three of these variables. Does one's evidence entail that the fourth variable has a particular value? That depends upon how we interpret the sentences used to state evidence and conclusion. Let (1)-(3) be those sentences:

1. "The container contains 1 litre of water at 3:00pm."
2. "The tap ejects water at a rate of 2/3 litre per minute."
3. "The container contains 3 litres of water at 3:03pm."

Interpret (1)-(3) with a model that contains a set of objects $D$, a set of worlds $W$, a set of times $T$, and an interpretation function $I$. $I$ assigns to each sentence a function from worlds and times to truth-values in the normal way. Which worlds and times should we use to interpret the sentences?

In $M1$, $I$ assigns functions from logically possible worlds and all times to truth-values to (1)-(3) i.e. complete functions. So there will be some worlds, such that (1) and (2) are true but (3) isn’t; for example, $w'$ where $c = 1$, $k = 2/3$, and $t = 3$, yet, because there's a hole in the beaker, $y = 1$. Thus interpreted, (1) and (2) don't entail (3).

In $M2$, $I$ assigns (partial) functions from the times and worlds such that the equation $y = kt + c$ is true, to truth-values. Any world like $w'$, which, given $M1$, is such that (1) and (2) are true but (3) is false, is now, given $M2$, such that (1), (2), and (3) are neither true nor false. Each sentence semantically presupposes the existence of the invariance described by the equation. Thus interpreted, (1) and (2) do entail (3).

**Summary:** I explain how an infallibilist can reject the under-determination thesis by generalizing from the paradigm case i.e. by endorsing the assumption that a speaker, in a context, interprets the sentences used to express her evidence and conclusion relative to the possible states of a set of states of affairs that stand in an invariant relation for a time (like the beaker/tap arrangement). I argue that the epistemological and linguistic commitments the infallibilist thereby encumbers are acceptable.

**Acceptance, Belief, and Deductive Cogency**

*Finnur Dellsén, University College Dublin*

Let us say that a propositional attitude $A$ satisfies deductive cogency just in case the set of propositions towards which it would be rational to have attitude $A$ is both consistent and closed under logical consequence. It’s clear that many propositional attitudes do not satisfy deductive cogency. In particular, the well-known lottery and preface paradoxes (Kyburg, 1961; Makinson, 1965) show that deductive cogency is violated by the attitude of high confidence (e.g. above 90% confidence) if we assume that rational degrees of confidence should be probabilistically coherent. Moreover, since our pretheoretical notion of belief – what is variously known in the literature as “full”, “outright”, or “binary” belief – seems closely tied to such a state of high confidence, many philosophers have concluded that such beliefs also violate deductive cogency. Indeed, a number of philosophers have recently argued that deductive cogency, as such, has no role to play in the theory of epistemic rationality (e.g., Foley, 1992, 2009; Christensen, 2004; Kolodny, 2007; Worsnip, 2015). Against this trend, I argue here that deductive cogency is an important requirement for epistemic rationality, albeit not as a requirement on (full or...
partial) belief. Instead, building on a distinction between belief and acceptance proposed by Jonathan Cohen (1989, 1992), I develop a position on which deductive cogency applies to certain kinds of acceptance – where acceptance of a proposition consists in treating the proposition as given in some particular context. Specifically, the position proposed in the paper is that deductive cogency holds for treating propositions as given in certain intellectual contexts, e.g. in the context of giving explanations, providing arguments, and proposing narratives. I argue that this preserves the requirement of deductive cogency for an important class of propositional attitudes, while at the same time acknowledging that our pretheoretical notion of belief is too closely tied to a state of high confidence for beliefs to satisfy this logical requirement.

In order to motivate this position and situate it in the current literature, I examine a recent exchange between Mark Kaplan (1995, 1996, 2013), who defends deductive cogency for belief, and David Christensen (2004), who argues vigorously against it. I first argue that although Kaplan’s arguments do not show that deductive cogency is a requirement on belief, they do strongly suggest that the requirement applies to acceptance. I then go on to argue that Christensen’s objections to deductive cogency for belief are not only compatible with, but indeed congenial to, the position that acceptance satisfies deductive cogency. The upshot is that we can accommodate Kaplan’s considerations in favor of deductive cogency while at the same time avoiding Christensen’s objections by taking deductive cogency to be a requirement on acceptance rather than belief. I conclude that deductive cogency still has an important role to play in our epistemic lives.

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Interpersonal Epistemic Justification: a Non-Reductionist Account
Peter Dennis, London School of Economics

We seek not only to be justified in our beliefs, but also to justify our beliefs to one another. While epistemologists have tended to focus on the former kind of justification (viz. individual epistemic justification), it is through the second kind of justification (viz. interpersonal epistemic justification) that our most successful forms of enquiry make progress. The aim of my presentation will be to defend an account of interpersonal epistemic justification (IPEJ) on which it is a form of shared rational inquiry capable of generating second-personal epistemic reasons.

My talk will be divided into four sections. In section (i), I give a pre-theoretical description of IPEJ and distinguish it from related practices like rational persuasion, collective deliberation, testimony, and teaching. In section (ii), I outline four questions that any account of IPEJ can be expected to answer. They are:

1. How does IPEJ differ from the related practices mentioned in section I?
2. Why do we insist on IPEJ in certain contexts but not others?
3. What is the function or purpose of IPEJ?
4. How does IPEJ allow us to exert normative leverage over one another's epistemic lives?

In section (iii), I canvass some reasons to be suspicious of 'reductionist' accounts, according to which the epistemic significance of IPEJ can be fully explained in terms of non-interpersonal epistemic concepts like (individual) epistemic justification,
knowledge, or information (see Goldman 1994; 1997; 1999; 2003). In short, I argue that reductionist accounts cannot provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed in section (ii).

In section (iv), I present my alternative, non-reductionist account. According to this view, IPEJ is the practice that allows us to be accountable for our beliefs to others and to hold others to account for theirs. Being epistemically accountable to someone in this way entails respecting their ‘epistemic autonomy’. Agents exhibit epistemic autonomy to the extent that their reasoning is free from external interference and manipulation, and crucial epistemic decisions (e.g. about what to believe and what evidence to consider) are not made on their behalf. Respect for the hearer’s epistemic autonomy requires speakers to infer their target propositions from within a ‘neutral epistemic point of view’—that is, from within a negotiated epistemic outlook that is acceptable to both speaker and hearer. While reasoning from within this perspective, speaker and hearer are formally related as co-participants in a shared rational enquiry. This allows them to make certain demands on one another concerning the direction their inquiry will take. In particular, a speaker can oblige the hearer to accept a given proposition so long as it is entailed by elements belonging to the neutral point of view. With reference to recent work by Darwall (2006), McMyler (2011), and Peter (2014), I suggest that the obligation in question cannot be fully explained in terms of the hearer’s individual epistemic reasons, but are irreducibly second-personal in nature.

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**Fallible Knowledge: New Ways to Talk about an Old Problem**

*Paul Dimmock, Peking University*

A familiar problem for fallibilism is that attempts to convey the fallibility of our knowledge result in apparent contradiction: ‘I know P, but it might be that not-P’ and ‘I know P, but there’s a chance that not-P’ are commonly noted examples. The paper identifies three promising fallibilist responses (one pre-existing, two new) to this problem. Each response enables the fallibilist to explain the appearance of contradiction associated with utterances such as ‘I know P, but it might be that not-P’ whilst retaining an invariantist semantics for ‘know’. Fantl & McGrath (*Knowledge in an Uncertain World*) have argued that the pre-existing response requires anti-intellectualism; our two new responses do not require that controversial thesis. Having thus laid out the fallibilist’s options/commitments, the paper turns to develop a ‘new’ problem for fallibilism. The recent literature has focused almost exclusively on speakers’ attempts to express the fallibility of their own present knowledge (examples like ‘I know P, but it might be that not-P’ are a case in point). The paper argues that there are in fact multiple ways to express fallibility, and that our three fallibilist responses are unable to meet the challenge these varied expressions of fallibility present. The upshot is that the fallibilist is unable to explain away the contradictory-sounding nature of her view, at least not whilst retaining commitment to an invariantist semantics for ‘know’. The paper thus provides new motivation to adopt contextualism and/or infallibilism.

**No Commitment to the Truth**

*Anna-Maria A. Eder, University of Salzburg*

Most epistemologists consider (the notion of) epistemic justification to be normative. In particular, many endorse the *ought account* of the normative status of justification, which says:

**OUGHT** An agent is (epistemically) justified to believe a proposition $p$ if and only if $p$ (epistemically) ought to believe $p$.

This account provokes the following questions: Why does OUGHT hold? And why is justification...
normative at all? Popular answers to these questions involve that justification is normative because justifiably believing a proposition adequately serves an appropriate epistemic end. Accordingly, the normativity is based on the conduciveness to the appropriate epistemic end, which is supposed to be valuable. For the purpose of this paper I presuppose that some such epistemic teleological position with respect to justification is correct. That is, I accept the following:

**EPISTEMIC TELEOLOGY** An agent \( s \) is justified to believe a proposition \( p \) if \( s \)'s believing \( p \) adequately serves (or would serve) the appropriate epistemic end.

The first aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the following position is the only epistemic teleological position that is tenable:

**PROBABLY DOXASTIC END** An agent \( s \) is justified to believe a proposition \( p \) if the probability that \( s \)'s believing \( p \) serves the doxastic end with respect to \( p \) on \( s \)'s epistemic background is high.

(The doxastic end with respect to a proposition \( p \) is the epistemic end of not believing \( p \) if \( p \) is false.)

The second aim of this paper is to show that PROBABLY DOXASTIC END opposes the ought account and supports the permissibility account, which claims:

**PERMISSIBILITY** An agent \( s \) is justified to believe a proposition \( p \) if \( s \) is permitted to believe \( p \).

In contrast to OUGHT, PERMISSIBILITY allows, without further specification, for suspension of judgement even in cases where one would be justified to believe the proposition in question.

In this presentation, I proceed as follows: In Section 1, I introduce and criticize teleological positions that refer to agents’ de facto epistemic aims (i.e., epistemic ends agents aim at) as the appropriate epistemic ends mentioned in EPISTEMIC TELEOLOGY. I go on and review, in Section 2, teleological positions that refer to epistemic ends that are commonly considered by epistemologists to be worthwhile and are not necessarily de facto aims of agents. I show that these latter positions all suffer from a common shortcoming: they refer to epistemic ends that may be merely hypothetical aims (i.e., ends agents do not aim at). I criticize that as a consequence, justification is only normative hypothetical or conditional on the fact that the aim is hold by the agent in question. Finally, in Section 3, I propose PROBABLY DOXASTIC END, which is new and makes up for this shortcoming. I defend my teleological position against objections that have been raised and show that PROBABLY DOXASTIC END favors PERMISSIBILITY over OUGHT.

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**Can Foundationalism Avoid Arbitrary Basic Beliefs?**

*Coos Engelsma, University of Groningen*

According to foundationalism, all beliefs should ultimately be justified by ‘basic beliefs’: beliefs that are justified without somehow relying on further beliefs. One objection to foundationalism says that by allowing beliefs to be justified without support from further beliefs, the theory licenses a form of arbitrariness.

This arbitrariness objection to foundationalism has recently gained much attention through the writings of Peter Klein. Several foundationalists have criticized Klein’s objection, arguing either that it is viciously circular, or that foundationalism need not sanction arbitrariness. In arguing so, these foundationalists have usually taken for granted (what they think is) Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. As I have shown elsewhere, however, Klein’s concept of arbitrariness suffers from serious defects. Hence, even if foundationalism is able to avoid arbitrariness on Klein’s concept, it may still be that it cannot avoid arbitrariness on a more plausible concept.

In my talk, I reconsider the relation between foundationalism and arbitrariness. But unlike all epistemologists who have discussed this relation so far, I do this by first constructing a suitable concept of epistemic arbitrariness.

In Part 1, I briefly explain foundationalism as the most dominant response to the regress problem. In Part 2, I provide my analysis of the concept of epistemic arbitrariness. Relying on an intuitive notion of arbitrary choices, I explain that a belief can be arbitrary in both an objective and a subjective sense. S’s belief that \( p \) is objectively arbitrary if nothing in fact favors \( p \) over not-\( p \). It avoids objective arbitrariness if and only if there exists a reason favoring \( p \) over not-\( p \). S’s belief that \( p \) is
subjectively arbitrary if the information available to S does not favor the belief that p over the belief that not-p. It avoids subjective arbitrariness if and only if S has a reason to prefer p to not-p.

In Part 3, I evaluate foundationalism in terms of the concept of arbitrariness developed in Part 2 by considering what the foundationalist can require of S's basic belief that b. As for objective arbitrariness, I argue that nothing prevents the foundationalist from requiring that this belief is supported by the existence of a reason that favors b over not-b and, hence, that the foundationalist can avoid objective arbitrariness. As for subjective arbitrariness, however, I argue that the foundationalist cannot consistently require that S has a reason to prefer b to not-b. I explain that she cannot require this because having a reason for preferring b to not-b involves both (i) having evidence, E, for b, and (ii) having a justified belief that E makes b more probable than not-b. I argue that the foundationalist cannot require that condition (ii) is met without ceasing to be a foundationalist.

I conclude that although the foundationalist may be able to avoid arbitrariness on Klein's concept of arbitrariness, it cannot rule out arbitrariness on a more plausible concept thereof.

Should we believe only what we know?

Davide Fassio, University of Southampton

Many philosophers have argued that belief is constitutively governed by a knowledge norm (e.g., Littlejohn 2013, forthcoming; Williamson 2000, 2005; see Benton 2014, §3a, for an overview). According to this norm,

(KN) For any subject S and proposition p, S should believe p only if S knows p.

Some arguments for the knowledge norm of belief rely on a parallel between belief and assertion (Adler 2002; Huemer 2007; Sosa 2010; Williamson 2000). Other arguments are based on considerations about the way in which we tend to assess (justify and criticize) our beliefs (Williamson 2005), and the relation between knowledge and doxastic justification (Littlejohn 2013, forthcoming). The aim of my talk is to argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief. First, I will show that the various arguments supposed to favour the knowledge norm of belief do not necessarily favour this norm over other candidate norms, such as the truth norm. Second, I will provide several arguments against the idea that belief is governed by a knowledge norm. In particular I will argue that the knowledge norm: i) cannot explain cases of culpable ignorance (Gibbons 2013; Lord 2014) and excusing ignorance (Peels 2014; Rosen 2002; Smith 1983; Zimmerman 2008); ii) doesn’t account for the specific way in which evidential considerations normatively motivate a subject engaged in doxastic deliberation; iii) can justify the violation of requirements of rationality (Broome 2013); iv) cannot provide reasons to believe, and because of that it is incompatible with the idea that epistemic reasons are evidence (Hawthorne & Magidor forthcoming; Williamson 2000). I will also consider alternative formulations of the norm and show that each formulation is affected by specific problems.

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In this paper, we connect two debates concerning doxastic systems. First, there is the debate on how to adequately bridge quantitative and qualitative systems of belief. At the centre of this discussion is the so-called Lockean thesis (LT), according to which a proposition A is believed by an agent iff the agent’s degree of belief in A exceeds a specific threshold r, i.e.: \( \text{Bel}(A) \text{ iff } P(A) > r \). It is well known that this thesis can come into conflict with other constraints on rational belief, such as consistency (CO) and deductive closure (DC), unless great care is taken. Leitgeb’s (2014) stability theory of belief provides an elegant means for maintaining (LT), (CO), and (DC). The theory is based on the notion of P-stability. A proposition, B, is P-stable-r (for a probability function P) iff for all C consistent with B: \( P(B|C) > r \).

Beyond the debate concerning how to relate quantitative and qualitative systems of belief, there are debates concerning how to aggregate qualitative belief sets, on the one hand, and probability functions, on the other. In the literature on opinion pooling and social choice, several constraints on such aggregations are discussed, centering on Arrow’s (1950) impossibility result. Similar results apply to the aggregation of qualitative belief sets and probability functions. The former result is known as ‘discursive dilemma’.

Given the debate on the relationship between qualitative and quantitative belief, and the debate concerning how to aggregate belief systems of the two types, it is quite natural to ask whether qualitative and quantitative aggregation can be performed in a ‘synchronized’ way. In particular, is it possible to devise systems of qualitative and quantitative belief aggregation, such that when we aggregate corresponding qualitative and quantitative belief systems, that are related according to Leitgeb’s stability theory (thereby ensuring the satisfaction of (LT), (CO), and (DC)), the outputted belief systems are also related according to Leitgeb’s stability theory (so satisfying (LT), (CO), and (DC))?

We present a variety of results bearing on the preceding question. Under the assumption of reasonable aggregation principles, P-stability-r is not generally preserved when aggregating corresponding qualitative and quantitative belief systems. However, we show some possibility results of combining a principle on preserving P-stability-r with common aggregation constraints as, e.g., universality and non-dictatorship.

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I believe Brentano’s work contains the theoretical resources for an account of knowledge on which things can be known pristinely and without mediation, that is, just as they are in themselves. The immediacy of this account of knowledge makes it a variety of direct realism; yet, in primary cases, one’s justification for believing things are as they appear is both non-inferential and internally accessible and so it is also a variety of traditional foundationalism.

Such an account of knowing things in themselves might initially seem farfetched. There are supposed to be obvious problems with direct realism, stemming from cases of illusion or hallucination. For the last several decades, foundationalism has widely been regarded a quaint and misguided view of the structure of epistemic justification. The combination of direct realism and foundationalism is thought to give rise to yet further problems, which even the few contemporary proponents of foundationalism deem insuperable. Moreover, and perhaps most pointedly, it seems clear from Brentano’s best-known work that he rejects direct realism and, although he is a foundationalist, his foundationalism is of just the sort that makes knowledge of anything beyond one’s own mental states seem problematic. So the prospects of a Brentanian directly realist foundationalism might seem quite unpromising indeed. Nonetheless, I argue that it is in Brentano’s work that one finds the means for a plausible directly realist account of pristine knowledge of things in the world, one that
is defensibly (and traditionally) foundationalist.

In order to see this, one must bear in mind, as I argue, that ontological issues—and more specific metaphysical ones pertaining to the nature of mind—are prior to epistemological ones, and appreciate that within a certain ontological framework standard objections to an account of knowing things in themselves are ineffectual. To the end of propounding this account, I first characterize, in §II, the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind. These resources are yielded by Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology, a project whose goals obscure the ontological framework in which it takes place. In §III, I reveal this framework. Doing so is instrumental to illuminating acquaintance, the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind and some other thing. I discuss this state in §IV, and in the following section, §V, show how it is has the epistemic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the foundations of one’s knowledge of the world. A directly realist foundationalist account of knowledge is open to a compelling objection, based on the subjective indistinguishability between veridical and non-veridical experiences. I present this objection in §VI with the means of undermining it. In the concluding §VII, I recur to the opening theme of the primacy of ontology and suggest that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are all based on questionable—and ultimately untenable—ontological presuppositions.

Defenders of the latter view focus on the associative, emotional and behavioral components of implicit attitudes (e.g. Gendler’s (2008) notion of “alief”) and hold that these characteristics undermine a belief-attribution.

In my talk, I propose a novel account of implicit attitudes. The defended account aims at doing justice to the phenomenal aspects of implicit attitudes while avoiding the challenges sui generis accounts face. I will expose the view by concentrating on the discordance of explicitly held beliefs and implicit bias.

The key-idea of the proposed account is that implicit attitudes are belief-like states, but couched in phenomenal concepts. Traditionally, the notion of “phenomenal concepts” is used to explain anti-physicalist arguments by pointing at special concepts that directly pick out phenomenal states in terms of their phenomenal character (see Loar 1997, Alter & Walter 2007). I use the notion of “phenomenal concepts” in a broader sense (analogously to Lehrer’s (2006) notion of “exemplarization”). On my view, phenomenal concepts – besides picking out phenomenal states – can also be deployed to refer to external objects or situations in terms of how they phenomenally appear to the subject. I argue that the latter use of phenomenal concepts is germane to implicit bias. Thus, discordancy cases involving implicit bias should be analyzed as follows. There is a tension between an explicit belief, couched in objective concepts, and an implicit attitude, couched in subjective phenomenal concepts.

In a next step, I will demonstrate that this account does justice to the phenomenal aspect of implicit bias without reducing its content to a purely associative and emotional one. Moreover, it avoids some challenges that sui generis accounts face. For example, “aliefs” are accused of not being truth-apt due to their purely associative contents. In contrast, the phenomenal concepts account account points towards a propositional content of implicit attitudes, though represented in a special way.

Finally, I argue that the defended account is explanatory powerful. It elucidates why implicit bias is not sensitive to evidence, at least not in a direct way. Moreover, the distinct ways of representing explain how implicit attitudes can involve content-awareness, while the subject is ignorant of this content standing in tension to the content of the explicit belief. Importantly, this

Discordant Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Phenomenal Concepts
Martina Fürst, University of Graz, Austria

In the recent literature, cases in which one explicitly endorses that p but does not act in accordance with p are heavily discussed and motivate a philosophical analysis of implicit attitudes. There is significant controversy about how to characterize such implicit attitudes. On the doxastic view, implicit attitudes are beliefs or belief-like attitudes. Accordingly, cases of discordances between implicit and explicit attitudes can be seen as instances of discordant or conflicting beliefs (Gertler 2011, Mandelbaum 2015, Frankish forthcoming) or as instances of in-between beliefs (Schwitzgebel 2001). The competing view has it that the implicit attitudes underlying these cases constitute a distinct, sui generis kind of mental state.
explanation for the source of the ignorance prepares the ground for new strategies of modulating and overcoming implicit bias.

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Occurrent belief and dispositional belief
Jie Gao, University of Edinburgh

It has been widely acknowledged among philosophers that a belief can be held in two forms: dispositional and occurrent. Representationalism identifies dispositional beliefs with stored representations, and occurrent beliefs with activations of these representations, preparatory to their employment in reasoning and decision-making. Moreover, according to this picture, if a subject holds an occurrent belief that p, she also holds a dispositional belief that p. Once a belief is occurrently formed for the first time, it is automatically added to the "belief box" and ready to be called into mind for future purposes. The aim of this talk is to challenge this picture. I will argue that the two forms of belief, dispositional and occurrent, do not entail each other.

I will first observe how occurrent belief formation and subjective confidence are subject to the effects of a major psychological factor called ‘need-for-closure’ that is responsive to a variety of practical factors (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991, 1996; Kruglanski et al. 1993; Nagel, 2008; Webster, 1993). Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief and how much evidence one needs for gaining further confidence in a given proposition; it also influences the accuracy of one’s cognition. Motivations for high need-for-closure may make one cognitively impatient and reckless. By contrast, motivations for low need-for-closure may produce tendencies to relish uncertainty and to be cautious in belief-formation. I will argue that this practical sensitivity of occurrent belief and subjective confidence, although deviating from an epistemic ideal (i.e., the exclusive sensitivity of beliefs to evidential factors), is required by our cognitive limitations.

The sensitivity of occurrent belief to practical factors deepens the gap between the two forms of belief. While dispositional beliefs provide grounds one can rely on for all types of reasoning in normal circumstances, occurrent beliefs are formed given particular needs of current reasoning, also in abnormal circumstances. Furthermore, formation of an occurrent belief can require either more or less evidence than the formation a dispositional belief. Two consequences are discussed. First, some occurrent beliefs formed in practical environments with strong motivation for high need-for-closure may be formed on too meagre evidential grounds to be added to the belief box. Second, a dispositional belief may fail to turn into an occurrent belief when a practical environment calls for remarkably cautious decisions.

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**Justification, Truth-Conduciveness, and the New Evil Demon Problem**

Benoit Gaultier, Collège de France

My aim in this presentation is threefold. I try to show that: 1) the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is useful for determining the nature of justification, contrary to what Clayton Littlejohn has recently claimed; 2) the NEDP does not succeed in showing that the justification of a belief may be independent from the truth-conduciveness of its mode of formation; 3) the justification of a belief depends on whether or not the way it has been formed is sufficiently truth-conducive, not on whether any norm of belief (whether it is truth or knowledge) has been satisfied.

The first claim I shall defend is that, contrary to Littlejohn, it is not methodologically improper to try to determine whether a belief is justified on the basis of our intuition that “there is something going for the subject and the subject's beliefs” when she is deceived in the way the NED deceives her. I agree with Littlejohn that we should certainly not move directly from this intuition to the conclusion that NED victims have justified beliefs. More precisely, we should not assume on this basis that we can make substantive claims about the nature of justification. Nevertheless, I think that a good epistemological strategy is to start from our intuition that there is something epistemically valuable in the beliefs of NED victims, and then to try to articulate the epistemic properties that make these beliefs epistemically valuable. In the same way that recent discussions about the distinctive value of knowledge have helped to clarify the nature of knowledge, I shall argue that starting from the epistemic value of NED victims' beliefs helps us to clarify the nature of justification—if it is admitted that the arguably polysemous concept of justification is appropriate when it comes to designating the properties that make these beliefs epistemically valuable.

I shall then contend that the NEDP does not succeed in showing that the justification of a belief can be independent from the truth-conduciveness of its mode of formation. Against those who draw internalist conclusions from the NEDP, externalists have usually wielded one of following two arguments: 1) internalists confuse doxastic justification, epistemic permission, the satisfaction of the norms of belief, and having a (normative) reason to believe something with personal justification, epistemic blamelessness, reasonability, and having excusably not satisfied the norms of belief (M. Engel, Blome-Tillman, Littlejohn, Williamson); 2) the beliefs of NED victims are not only justified but also formed in a reliable, or truth-conducive way, even if they are not formed in a locally reliable way (Goldman, Comesaña, Sosa, Goldberg). Against the first argument, I shall argue that there is something epistemically positive, or epistemically non-defective, in the beliefs of NED victims, and not only something excusably faulty. Against the second strategy, I shall claim—contrary to what is generally admitted—that the beliefs of the NED victims succeed in satisfying the local reliability, or truth-conduciveness, externalist requirement (which is, as Littlejohn as remarks, constitutive of externalism about justification, and hence something that externalists should not abandon). I agree with Brent Madison that, when properly conceived, the epistemic situation of NED victims excludes the epistemic value of their beliefs being based upon the fact that, outside the NED's deceptive world, the way they have been formed would be truth-conducive. However, contrary to Madison, it does not ensue that justification possesses an irreducibly internalist dimension: when the epistemic situation of NED victims is properly conceived and clearly distinguished from ordinarily cases of epistemic misfortune—which is the raison d'être of the NEDP—the way they form beliefs is truth-conducive in the world created by the NED, even if the content of their concepts and beliefs is the same as ours in the ordinary world. I'll defend this apparently counterintuitive claim by arguing that the world created by the NED is of the same kind as ours (another apparently counterintuitive claim)—so that the epistemic situation of NED “victims” is no different to ours. In order to defend this position, I'll show that the NED victims' beliefs are not false in the sense in which we ordinarily claim that some of our beliefs are false. Accordingly, I'll argue that the NED should have created another kind of world if she wanted to rob the beliefs of her victims of epistemic value,
reliability, and justification: an (at least partly) dreamlike, inconsistent, irregular, lawless world.

I’ll eventually argue that the justification of a belief depends on whether or not the way it has been formed is sufficiently truth-conducive, not on whether any norm of belief (whether it is truth or knowledge) has been satisfied. I’ll argue, more specifically, that 1) whether or not a belief is justified depends on whether or not the believer has attained a sufficiently high level of doxastic performance (in a sense to be defined); and 2) that Williamson and Littlejohn’s similar recent arguments for the claim that knowledge is the norm of belief—and therefore that a belief is not justified unless it amounts to knowledge (since for them justification is understood in terms of satisfaction of the norm of belief)—in fact drives a wedge between justification and permissibility. And this, I’ll argue, is a big problem for their normativism about justification.

Sensitivity and Necessity
Simon Gaus, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Robert Nozick introduced the notion of sensitivity. 

(SEN) S sensitively believes that \( p \) via method M just in case S would not believe that \( p \) via M if \( p \) were false.

Nozick and others have suggested that (SEN) is a necessary condition for knowledge and, as such, can explain why Gettier cases are not cases of knowledge and why we don’t know that we aren’t brains in vats although we know that we have hands, and why we don’t usually know that our lottery ticket will not win. One might also (or alternatively) think that (SEN) is a necessary or a sufficient condition for justification, or that sensitivity bestows at least defeasible justification.

The general intuition underlying these suggestions is that sensitivity constitutes a certain kind of access or truth-connectedness that contributes positively to the epistemic status of a given belief.

Michael Blome-Tillmann has recently argued, however, that (SEN) is not supported by such intuitions. His argument is essentially this: We can transform any contingently true proposition into a necessarily true one by inserting an “actually”-operator – because if \( p \) is true in the actual world, then it is true in all possible worlds that \( p \) is true in the actual world. Now, given the counterfactual nature of (SEN), beliefs in necessarily true propositions are trivially sensitive. However, the belief "I actually am a brain in a vat" does not seem any closer to being knowledge than the belief "I am a brain in a vat", and it does not seem to make any difference for the intuitiveness of Gettier cases whether Jones believes that the person who gets the job has coins in her pockets or whether he believes that, in the actual world, the person who gets the job has coins in her pocket. Thus, concludes Blome-Tillman, whatever explains our intuitions about Gettier cases, brains in vats-knowledge and lottery winner-knowledge, it cannot be (SEN).

I argue that this is mistaken: There are a number of examples that give us independent reason to think that propositions of the form “If \( p \) were false, I would not believe it” are non-trivial even if \( p \) is necessarily true – even if, in fact, \( p \) is logically necessarily true – and that, b) this clearly is the sense of such counterfactual conditions that sensitivity theorists have in mind. Here’s one example: "If this proof were invalid, some mathematician would have found out by now and would have become so famous that even I would have heard of it. But I haven’t heard of anything of the sort, so the proof must be valid.”

Thus, sensitivity theorists need not be worried about necessarily true propositions. This, moreover, has upshots for related debates in metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics: Since it is a genuinely open question whether a belief in a necessary proposition is sensitive, epistemological challenges to mathematical or metaethical realism based on sensitivity-informed accounts of moral or mathematical knowledge cannot be refuted by pointing out that mathematical or moral propositions are necessarily true.

Epistemic Diversity and Epistemic Injustice
Mikkel Gerken, University of Edinburgh

I pursue three aims: First, I provide a characterization of epistemic diversity by specifying its relation to disagreement. Second, I argue that epistemic diversity has some epistemically problematic consequences. Third, I argue that these
consequences give rise to varieties of epistemic injustice.

This focus on the negative aspects of epistemic diversity is meant to counterbalance a trend of emphasizing its many positive aspects. In contrast, I will discuss how epistemic diversity may defeat or diminish testimonial warrant. This is not to oppose the view that there are many epistemically positive aspects of epistemic diversity. However, a better understanding of challenges that arise from epistemic diversity is required for a balanced assessment of its overall epistemic properties and wider ramifications. Such a balanced assessment of epistemic diversity, in turn, is required for diagnosing some subtle varieties of epistemic injustice that epistemically diverse minorities may suffer. These include testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as well as testimonial smothering (Fricker 2007, Dotson 2011). Importantly, I will argue that securing epistemic diversity is by itself insufficient to secure that it is epistemically benefcial or that epistemically diverse groups do not suffer epistemic injustices.

Perceptual Knowledge and Self-Knowledge: a Rumination on Reasons
Andrea Giananti, University of Fribourg

S’s perceptual knowledge that \( p \) ought to be explained in terms of S’s having a reason for \( p \). I defend and qualify this idea in the context of a debate on Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED).

1. ED combines two theses:

   - **Accessibility**: S’s perceptual knowledge that \( p \) is explained by S’s having a reectively accessible reason for \( p \).
   - **Factivity**. S’s reason is factive.

The kind of reason that fits the bill is seeing that: S’s knowledge that \( p \) is explained in terms of S’s seeing that \( p \). On a standard conception, seeing that \( p \) entails knowledge:

   - **Entailment Thesis (ET)**: seeing that \( p \) entails knowledge that \( p \).

Pritchard (2012) worries that ED faces the basis problem: if seeing that \( p \) entails knowledge that \( p \), then seeing that \( p \) cannot be “part of the rational basis for one’s paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as epistemological disjunctivism maintains” (Pritchard 2012: 25).

In fact, the problem arises only if one accepts some independency constraint on reasons.

**Independence**: a reason explains knowledge that \( p \) only if it could be possessed independently of knowledge that \( p \).

Pritchard’s solution is to reject ET: seeing that \( p \) “guarantees that one is in a good position to gain knowledge” (26), without entailing knowledge.

Rejecting ET is problematic, both because of linguistic arguments given by French (2012) and because it implies a wrong picture of the way in which facts fgure in our deliberations concerning what to believe. I propose to reject independence instead.

2. I claim that perceptual knowledge that \( p \) incorporates a piece of self-knowledge to the efect that one sees that \( p \). Although this is not available independently of knowledge that \( p \), it is explanatory, in that it makes human knowledge a self-conscious act of rationality.

This can be unpacked as follows: when I see that \( p \), I am in a position to judge that \( p \), and also that I see that \( p \). Further, I can formulate the latter judgment simply in virtue of seeing that \( p \). On the basis of the plausible principle that one can judge that \( p \) simply by having an experience only if one is aware of \( p \) in having the experience, I conclude that when I see that \( p \), I am aware that I see that \( p \); this suggests that perceptual knowledge is a self-conscious act. That the act is also rational is due to its self-conscious character: if I assert that \( p \), and someone asks me why, in ordinary contexts I can satisfy a demand on rationality by responding that I see that \( p \), and I am able to invoke the reason that I see that \( p \) because seeing that \( p \) involves self-knowledge that I see that \( p \).

Thus the explanatory role of seeing that \( p \) consists in making available for a subject the credentials in virtue of which a certain episode counts as an episode of knowledge, even if these credentials are not available independently of whether the episode in question actually is one of knowledge.
Fact-introspection, Thing-introspection, and the Justification of Introspective Beliefs
Anna Giustina, Institut Jean Nicod/ENS/PSL

Traditionally, introspection has often been considered infallible, and knowledge grounded in it the most secure we might have. However, this tradition has been harshly criticised. Not only introspection is now mostly believed not to be infallible, but even its reliability has been recently challenged (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2008), on the basis of the claim that our introspective judgements are often false or uncertain. Such criticisms are particularly worrying because, by calling into question the justification of introspective beliefs, they pave the way for scepticism about the possibility of self-knowledge—even of the kind of self-knowledge which seems to be the most secure, namely phenomenal knowledge.

In this paper I try to offer a reply to those criticisms, and argue that (i) there is at least one kind of introspection whose reliability is not threatened by sceptical arguments, and (ii) introspective beliefs are indeed justified. What motivates my thesis is the intuition that introspective beliefs, although not infallible, do indeed seem pre-theoretically to be justified.

I suggest that a distinction should be drawn between two kinds of introspection, a concept-charged and a concept-free one. The former I call fact-introspection, the latter thing-introspection (the distinction is analogous to Dretske’s 1993 fact-awareness/thing-awareness distinction). The content of fact-introspection is propositional, conceptual, and publicly communicable, whereas the content of thing-introspection is non-propositional, non-conceptual, and not publicly communicable. The former is formed on the basis of the latter via a categorising process: some concepts are associated to the content of thing-introspection in order for the content of fact-introspection to be formed.

I argue that sceptical arguments against the reliability of introspection only target fact-introspection, leaving the possibility for thing-introspection to be reliable untouched. Error and uncertainty cases cited by the sceptics are not due to a flaw in thing-introspection, but rather to miscategorisation.

I further argue that, although fallible, introspective beliefs are nonetheless justified. My thesis is that one’s fact-introspecting that p provides one with immediate prima facie justification for believing that p. This is a version of dogmatism about justification (Pryor 2000; Huemer 2007). I argue that, in absence of defeaters, introspective beliefs are justified, simply in virtue of how conscious states appear in (fact-)introspection.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I briefly present some sceptical arguments against the reliability of introspection. Second, I explain the distinction between thing-introspection and fact-introspection, and roughly sketch what the relationship between them is—namely, how the content of the latter is formed on the basis of the content of the former. Then, I examine the sceptical arguments in the light of the fact-introspection/thing-introspection distinction, and show that they do not undermine the possibility for thing-introspection to be reliable. Finally, I outline and argue for a dogmatist theory of introspective belief justification. I conclude that introspective beliefs are justified.

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reflective knowledge and the knowledge that can be possessed by animals. Whereas animal knowledge is in essence a matter of one’s belief being the result of the apt exercise of cognitive virtue, reflective knowledge requires in addition a subjective perspective that supports the reliability of one’s belief-forming processes.

At its core, anti-luck epistemology is the attempt to spell out the platitude that knowledge is incompatible with luck (see Goldberg, 2015; Pritchard, 2005). It is faced by the following puzzle. While it is clear that knowledge is incompatible with ‘veritic luck’ – the kind of luck that is in play when one’s belief-forming methods only luckily produce a true belief – it is not so clear whether knowledge is also incompatible with ‘reflective luck’. Reflective luck is the kind of luck that obtains when one forms a true belief, but it seems from one’s perspective that one could have easily formed a false belief. One of the reasons it is unclear whether this kind of luck is incompatible with knowledge, is that we attribute knowledge to agents that do not possess the required reflective capacities to rule out reflective luck, such as animals and young children.

Incorporating Sosa’s insights, however, such knowledge-attributions rule out only the incompatibility between reflective luck and animal knowledge. It could well be that there are extra requirements on human knowledge that make it such that human knowledge cannot be reflectively lucky. Indeed, I will argue that Sosa’s requirement of a reflective perspective that supports the reliability of the sources of one’s belief is incompatible with a subjective perspective from which it seems that one could have easily formed a false belief – i.e. a perspective from which one’s belief is reflectively lucky. So it seems that while animal knowledge is compatible with reflective luck, reflective knowledge is not.

Borrowing a distinction from Sosa’s work on the nature of knowledge, we can thus resolve an open question for anti-luck epistemology. We can explain why we are sometimes inclined to ascribe knowledge even in the presence of substantial degrees of reflective luck, while at the same time upholding the fact that human knowledge in general is incompatible with such luck. Moreover, by relating the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge to various significant forms of epistemic luck, we get clearer on what is involved in meeting Sosa’s criteria for knowledge, both of the reflective and the animal level.

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Dogmatism, Meta-Coherence, and the Reliability of Sense Perception
Jean-Baptiste Guillon, Collège de France

Dogmatism about perceptual justification is the thesis that a perceptual experience with content P provides immediate justification for believing P, independently of any justification for other propositions Q.

This thesis has been defended by many authors inspired by (Moore 1925), including (Pollock 1970), (Pryor 2000) and (Huemer 2007). Pryor, in particular, is famous for defending dogmatism as an anti-sceptical strategy. In a nutshell, if dogmatism is true, then we can be justified by perceptual experience without having to rely on further justification against sceptical hypotheses (evil demons, dream, etc.). But sceptical arguments hinge on the requisite that we should have antecedent justification for such hypotheses. Therefore, sceptical arguments rely on unduly demanding requisites.

Recently, (McGrath 2013) has argued that Dogmatism couldn’t offer a satisfactory response to scepticism. I think that McGrath’s argument is on the right track, but that it depends on principles too complex and too committal to be fully efficient. My goal in this presentation is to provide a much simpler and more direct argument to the effect that Dogmatism (even if true) is a non-starter against scepticism; my argument will rely on only one epistemological requisite, which has the advantage of being both compelling and independently motivated.
This epistemological requisite is the **Principle of Meta-Coherence** (PMC). McGrath didn’t see the dialectical use he could have made of this very simple principle. And investigating the relationships between Dogmatism and Meta-Coherence is all the more interesting since some authors like (Huemer 2007; Huemer 2011) have defended both.

The Meta-Coherence principle states that whenever I have *prima facie* justification for believing P, I am committed upon reflection to believe (justifiably) that I know that P, otherwise my *prima facie* justification is defeated. Note here the proviso “upon reflection”: if I don’t reflect upon my belief, I can remain justified without any “second-order” belief to the effect that I know that P; but if I reflect, then I must be in a position to have the (justified) second-order belief, otherwise my first-order belief gets defeated.

Now, Dogmatism says that I can be justified in believing P without having justification against the possible underminers of P, for instance the general underminer that “Sense perception is not reliable” (~SPR). A child, who *doesn’t reflect* upon ~SPR, can be justified in believing “here is hand” without any antecedent justification against ~SPR. This is fine, but using the PMC the sceptic can grant all this, and still maintain his argument:

> “Granted, the unreflective child doesn’t need justification against ~SPR, but *once you start reflecting* whether SP is reliable or not, *then you need to be in a position to justifiably consider SP as reliable, otherwise your perceptual belief gets defeated*. And you cannot use your senses to justify SP, so you need independent (granted not antecedent) justification for SPR.”

In other words, the PMC shows that Dogmatism is a non-starter against scepticism when the sceptic (legitimately) insists on finding an answer to Alston’s (1993) tricky challenge as to how to justify SPR.

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**Being in a position to know and closure**

*Jan Heylen, KU Leuven*

Since the work by Cohen (1999), Williamson (2000) and Hawthorne (2004) the notion of being in a position to know has gained prominence. According to Rosenkranz (2007, p. 69) there are three necessary conditions for one’s being in a position to know a proposition \( p \): (1) \( p \) is true; (2) one is physically and psychologically capable of knowing \( p \); (3) nothing stands in one’s way of successfully exercising these capabilities. The concept of being in a position to know figures centrally in the debate about Williamson (2000)’s anti-luminosity argument (McHugh, 2010; Smith, 2012), the debate about what agnosticism amounts to Rosenkranz (2007), and the debate about what an epistemic quandary consists in (Wright, 2001; Rosenkranz, 2005; Greenough, 2009). In the applications of the notion in these debates one often makes use of closure principles. For instance,

1. if one is in a position to know that \( \varphi \) and if one is in a position to know that \( \varphi \) implies \( \psi \), then one is in a position to know that \( \psi \).

Closure principle 1 has been used by Rosenkranz (2007) and Greenough (2009) to justify the claim that, if one is in a position to know that \( \varphi (~\varphi) \), then one is in a position to know that one is *not* in a position to know that \( ~\varphi \). It has been argued that the latter is incorrect (Heylen, 2016). This does not preclude that weaker closure principles may be correct. For instance:

2. if one is in a position to know that \( \varphi \) and if one knows that \( \varphi \) implies \( \psi \), then one is in a position to know that \( \psi \).

3. if one knows that \( \varphi \) and if one is in a position to know that \( \varphi \) implies \( \psi \), then one is in a position to know that \( \psi \).

4. if one knows that \( \varphi \) and if one knows that \( \varphi \)
implies ψ, then one is in a position to know that ψ.

These weaker closure principles are not only theoretical options. Closure principle 2 has been applied by Rosenkranz (2005) and McHugh (2010). Moreover, Schaffer (2007) has claimed that closure principle 4 is perhaps the best binary closure principle. That claim has been indirectly challenged by Blome-Tillmann (2006).

My goals are twofold. First, I will argue that closure principles 2 and 3 are incorrect as well. The counterarguments will be related to the one given in (Heylen, 2016). Second, I will examine the consequences for the extant debates on the anti-luminosity argument, the nature of agnosticism and epistemic quandaries.

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Virtue and Safety
Jaakko Hirvelä, University of Helsinki

Recently some proponents of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) have argued that in virtue of satisfying the virtue-theoretic condition one will satisfy the safety condition. Call this idea the entailment thesis (ET). The reason why advocates of RVE have argued for ET is simple: If ET were true, then one would not satisfy the virtue-theoretic condition in cases featuring environmental luck, since the safety condition is not satisfied in cases of environmental epistemic luck. Given that cases featuring environmental epistemic luck pose perhaps the most pressing challenge against RVE, the motivation to argue for ET is clear.

While I agree that a version of RVE accompanied by ET would be an extremely simple and elegant theory of knowledge (at least compared to a theory that simply added a safety clause to the virtue-theoretic condition as is done in Pritchard (2012)), I do not find the arguments for ET convincing. The principal aim of this paper is to argue that ET is false.

Four recent arguments for ET are examined. Carter (2014) argues for ET by claiming that the attribution of a cognitive success to ability is compatible with the attribution of that cognitive success to luck just in case the success is more due to ability than luck. He argues that if that is the case, then the safety of the subject’s belief is ensured. Gaultier (2014) and Littlejohn (2014) argue for ET by noting that in cases of environmental luck the agent has not been afforded with an opportunity to exhibit her cognitive abilities, and that therefore there is no cognitive success in such cases. Greco (2010) can be seen as arguing for ET, since he thinks that in order for a subject to satisfy the virtue-theoretic condition, the subject’s cognitive abilities have to be the best explanation as to why the subject gained a true belief. Greco thinks that good epistemic luck undermines the explanatory salience of the subject’s cognitive abilities, and that the virtue-theoretic condition therefore entails the safety condition.

I will argue that these arguments entail a wrong kind of safety condition, one that we don’t have in mind when we require a belief to be safe from error. Carter’s solution is unable to deal with Gettier-style cases that feature inductive reasoning, while Gaultier’s and Littlejohn’s observations do not
enable the proponent of RVE to deal with a slightly altered version of the barn façade case. Greco’s solution fails also, since in addition to entailing a safety clause, it entails too strong conditions for when a belief is properly attributable to one’s cognitive abilities. In conclusion, none of the arguments that have been offered for ET entail the right kind of safety condition.

This shortfall propels us to search for the right kind of safety condition; one that the proponents of RVE should claim is entailed by satisfying the ability condition. Such a reformulation of the safety principle is offered. The new formulation of the safety condition, global safety, differs in important respects from previous versions of the principle that have been offered in the literature.

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Belief and Assertion: A Common Epistemic Norm?
Matthew Jope, KU Leuven

I survey the discussions surrounding the norm of belief and the norm of assertion. A popular view in the literature is that they are governed by a common normative standard (henceforth, commonality). Defenders of some form of commonality include Timothy Williamson (2000), Jonathon Adler (2002), and Igor Douven (2006). The driving force behind each defence seems to be a commitment to the view that belief and assertion are essentially the same kind of thing. Thus, Adler conceives of “belief as assertion to oneself” (p. 274), while Douven adds that “belief is a species of assertion” (p. 453), and Williamson thinks that belief and assertion are inner-outer correlates (p. 255). Though commonality seems to be a common intuition among epistemologists, I argue that there are good reasons to reject it.

My challenge to the commonality thesis is twofold. Firstly, I argue that the way we ordinarily use language, and the way we criticise the beliefs and assertions of others, suggests that we hold assertions to higher normative standards than we do beliefs. If this is correct, defenders of commonality have a problem: they need to explain why it is that, in response to a challenge, we sometimes find it ok to retract an assertion but to maintain the corresponding belief. They also need to explain why, in situations in which it is not ok for someone to flat out assert “p,” it is sometimes ok for them to assert “I believe.” Secondly, I back up these intuitions with some theoretical considerations about the nature of belief and assertion. I argue that it is not surprising that there are counterexamples to the commonality thesis because one of the key ideas motivating it is false: belief and assertion are fundamentally different kinds of things. I offer three arguments in support of this claim. Firstly, while assertions are plausibly the kinds of things over which we have immediate voluntary control, this is not so for belief. Secondly, it is not always the case that we know the content of our own minds. Thus, even when paying close attention to the matter, we can sometimes believe things unknowingly. The same is not true of assertions. If paying proper attention to the matter, we are always in a position to know that we are making an assertion. Lastly, beliefs and assertions are not mere inner-outer correlates because while assertions are a type of action, beliefs are more plausibly characterised as states.

I conclude that arguments in favour of commonality fail, and suggest that if we are inclined (as I am) towards something like a knowledge norm of assertion, commonality cannot be appealed to in order to show that knowledge is also the norm of belief. The norm of belief is plausibly something weaker than knowledge.

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Closure, Competence and Inquiry
Christoph Kelp, KU Leuven

A popular epistemic principle has it that knowledge extends across competent deduction in the sense that if you know p, competently deduce q from p and thereupon come to believe q, then you know q. I argue that, given a number of plausible bridging principles, my preferred virtue epistemological account of knowledge validates this closure principle. I then offer a theoretical argument that closure is actually false and show how my account of knowledge, in conjunction with slightly different bridging principles, serves to deliver a well-motivated restricted version of closure that accommodates the results of anti-closure argument.

Experts, Advisors and Authorities
Arnon Keren, University of Haifa

How should we take into account the known opinion of another person—an advisor—when her opinion differs from our own independently-formed opinion? Obviously, the answer depends on our own level of expertise as compared with that of the advisor: no one would claim that we should give the same weight to the opinion of a peer, whose level of expertise is similar to our own, and to that of an expert, whose level of expertise far exceeds our own. What is controversial is whether the only difference between the appropriate responses in both cases can be described in terms of the comparative weights to assign to our own opinion and to the differing opinion of the advisor.

According to one kind of view, the answer to the latter question is positive: whenever our independent opinion differs from that of an advisor, we should give some weight to our own opinions, and to that of the advisor. The case of the expert differs from that of a peer in that in the former we should assign a much greater weight to the advisor's opinion than to our own, while in the case of the peer, the weights assigned to each should be much more equal. Call this the expert-as-evidence view. A different kind of view draws a page from the political philosopher's discussion of political authority (Raz 1986), to describe the appropriate reaction to the opinion of an expert, and to reject the weights-assignments metaphor in this case. Call this the expert-as-authority view. According to this view, just as a legitimate, authoritative order to do something should function not merely as a very weighty consideration in favor of doing that thing, but as one that should preempt other considerations available to us, so with the expert: We should not treat the expert's opinion that p merely as an extremely weighty reason for believing that p, but should treat it instead as a preemptive reason for believing that p: as a reason for belief that should preempt basing our opinion regarding p on our own weighing of other evidence available to us.

In this paper, I compare between the expert-as-evidence view, as presented by Elga (2007) and others, and the experts-as-authority view, as presented by Zagzebski (2012) and others. These different kinds of views, I argue, have different implication about how we ought to interact with experts, and how experts ought to interact with us; moreover, they suggest different characterization of the kind of failure we exhibit when we fail to interact with experts as we ought to. On both accounts, I argue, the expert-as-authority view fairs better, in the sense that its implications better fit our pre-theoretic intuitions. Finally, I explore possible ways of defending the expert-as-authority view and the pre-theoretic intuitions which support it. I argue that while Zagzebski's recent attempt to justify this view by drawing on an argument made by Raz (1986) fails, an alternative account can succeed where Zagzebski's argument fails.

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Old wine in new bottles? Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against Moral Realism are either instances of the Benacerraf-Field Problem or trapped in a dilemma
Michael Klenk, Utrecht University

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are often presented as a powerful new tool in (moral) epistemology. Proponents of EDAs or ‘debunkers’, purport to limit our conception of moral objectivity and moral knowledge by invoking our evolutionary
history. Moral knowledge is unlikely, debunkers claim because mind-independent moral truths were evolutionary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those truths were not selected for. EDAs bear wider relevance for epistemology in general. They might show how empirical theory could drastically confine the scope of what David Wiggins called our “philosophical imagination”, that is, our theorising about the universe and our place within it.

Recently, however, many commentators in this debate have regarded the EDAs’ Darwinian premise as redundant. For example, David Enoch identifies Street’s EDA “as a particular instance” of the “most general epistemological challenge to realism [...], which is that of coming up with an explanation of a correlation between our relevant beliefs and the relevant truths” (2010:426). Other robust moral realists have followed Enoch this assessment, such as Cuneo (2014:424) and Wielenberg (2014:147), as well as uncommitted commentators on the debate such as Schechter (2010:438), and Crow (2015:4-5). These authors are correct in indicating that the EDAs’ Darwinian premise is redundant for its conclusion, but they fail to see that EDAs effectively collapse into an already well-known different problem: the Benacerraf-Field challenge, well-known from the philosophy of mathematics.

Street’s EDA and the Benacerraf-Field problem are both expressions of an epistemological worry. At first sight, however, they seem to be based on fundamentally different reasons. The Benacerraf-Field problem, on the one hand, is based upon the causal ineffectivity of abstract entities, which creates the challenge to “explain the reliability of our beliefs about that domain” (Field 1989:232–233). Street’s EDA, on the other hand, appears to target robust moral realism from an empirical, Darwinian perspective. However, does the EDA pose a problem for moral realism that is based on one of the best scientific theories, or does it just brush-up an existing argument by adding an illustrative veneer of Darwinian illustrations?

In my talk, I present a compounded dilemma for debunkers and show that EDAs are, as they stand, not novel arguments but rather ‘old wine’ of the Benacerraf-Field challenge. On dilemma A, Street’s EDA either reduces to the Benacerraf-Field challenge, which does not require an empirical premise about human evolution and thus doesn’t pose a novel challenge for moral realism, or it is formulated independently of the Benacerraf-field problem. In the latter case, however, the EDA faces dilemma B: either it is of limited scope, and targets only normative instead of metaethical positions, and or it begs the question against moral realism.

The upshot of my presentation is that EDAs do not add a novel problem for moral realism – they merely present the ‘old wine’ of the Benacerraf-Field problem in ‘new bottles’, namely in an ultimately redundant veneer of Darwinian considerations. Realists need not, for that matter, limit their philosophical imagination.

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Moran’s Transparency Claim and the Evidentialist Objection
Naomi Kloosterboer, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Richard Moran has developed a prominent account of selfknowledge that depends on the Transparency Claim (TC), which is the claim that “[w]hen asked ‘Do I believe P?’ , I can answer this question by consideration of the reasons in favor of P itself” (Moran 2003, 405). Characteristic of Moran’s TC is the idea that you acquire selfknowledge of your belief that p by making up your
mind about whether \( p \). The idea seems intuitively plausible: it seems that I can know whether I believe that it is raining by judging whether it is raining on the basis of the relevant reasons. However, spelling out the details of the account has proven difficult.

I will focus on one problem that Moran’s account faces, which is sometimes called the two topics problem (O’Brien 2007, 103), the puzzle of transparency (Byrne 2005, 95), and at other times the evidentialist objection (Barnett 2015, 2). What the problem boils down to is that evidence regarding \( p \) is not, normally, evidence for the fact that I believe that \( p \). So the question is: why is it legitimate to answer a question about whether I have a mental attitude regarding \( p \) by answering a question about a distinct topic, namely about \( p \) itself?

Moran’s response to this objection is the following (2003, 405): “I would have a right to assume that my reflection on the reasons in favor of rain provided me with an answer to the question of what my belief about the rain is, if I could assume that what my belief here is was something determined by the conclusion of my reflection on those reasons.” This raises the following questions: Can I make this assumption? Do I need to make this assumption explicitly? Does such an assumption imply that transparent self-knowledge is epistemically and psychologically indirect?

In my talk, I will first explain the evidentialist objection and Moran’s response to it in more detail. Next, I will discuss several questions that Moran’s reply raises, connected to criticism voiced by Barnett (2015), Finkelstein (2012) and Cassam (2014) amongst others. In the last part, I will suggest that Moran’s reply shouldn’t have included an assumption, but should have been about the structure of deliberation. If successful deliberation is the formation of an attitude, then Moran doesn’t need RA (cf. Boyle 2011, Roessler 2013, Stroud 2003).

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Why relative overlap is not a measure of coherence
Jakob Koscholke, University of Oldenburg

Coherence is the property of propositions hanging or fitting together. Intuitively, adding a proposition to some given set of propositions should result in the following three alternatives: (i) an increased, (ii) an unchanged, or (iii) a decreased degree of coherence. In this talk I show that probabilistic coherence measures based on relative set-theoretic overlap are in conflict with this intuitive verdict.

More precisely, it can be proven that (i) according to the naive overlap measure of coherence by Glass (2002) and Olsson (2002) it is impossible to increase a set’s degree of coherence by adding propositions and that (ii) according to the refined overlap measure of coherence by Meijs (2006) no set’s degree of coherence can exceed the degree of coherence of its maximally coherent subset which can only be a two-element set. We also show that this result carries over to all other subset-sensitive refinements of the naive overlap measure based on variations of the employed weighting procedure. As these two results stand in sharp contrast to elementary coherence intuitions, I conclude that coherence cannot be measured in terms of relative set-theoretic overlap.

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Bifurcated Skeptical Invariantism About Knowledge

Christos Kyriacou, University of Cyprus

I present an argument for a sophisticated version of skeptical invariantism: Bifurcated Skeptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that BSI can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. BSI can achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge, and explains how the pragmatics and the semantics of knowledge discourse operate at the interface of these two (sub)concepts of knowledge. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation.

The key idea is that, on the one hand, we need the infallible-and-sensitive concept of knowledge to (dis)solve and debunk the Gettier problem and, on the other hand, we need the fallible-but-safe concept of knowledge to save the Moorean epistemic appearance that we know quite a lot, at least in some sufficiently robust sense of ‘know’. Both are strong desiderata that a plausible theory of knowledge should accommodate and BSI is especially suited in doing so.

First, it (dis)solves the Gettier problem by means of debunking and our best theory should, arguably, tackle this notorious problem. It debunks the problem because indefeasible justification closes the logical gap between justification and truth that allows Gettier cases to slip through. In effect, the Gettier problem is not allowed the logical space to arise. Note also that the Gettier problem is a problem for the semantics of knowledge discourse and not the pragmatics. It is a problem for an analysis of ‘know’ that purports to give us respective truth-conditions and thereby its real meaning -not the merely conventional use of ‘know’. Therefore, it is the semantic theory that should surmount it and BSI does exactly this.

Second, BSI shows some due respect to the epistemic appearance that we know quite a lot, in some fairly robust sense of ‘know’, in a way that no extant skeptical invariantist theory does. We (fallibly-but-safely) know quite a lot because in ordinary epistemic contexts we mostly operate with (and often seem to satisfy) the fallible-but-safe (sub)concept of knowledge. Therefore, the Moorean intuition that we know a lot, in some robust sense of ‘know’, is vindicated. Of course, given the infallible-and-sensitive concept of knowledge that semantics employ, we do not really know (in the full-blooded sense of the term, anyway) in most contexts of our everyday lives. Strictly speaking, we do not know because, for one thing, it is always possible that our strongly-but-only-defeasibly justified true belief may fall prey to epistemic luck and constitute a Gettier case.

Knowing why

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To know why something happened is an important epistemic gain. Recently, the nature of knowledge-why has been addressed within the debate about whether understanding why p reduces to knowing why p. For some, this reduction is correct (see, e.g., Lipton 2004, Brogaard 2005, Grimm 2006 & 2014, Kelp 2014, Sliwa 2015, Riaz 2015), while others reject it (see, e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Elgin 2007, Pritchard 2008 & 2014, Hills 2009 & 2015, Morris 2012, de Regt 2015). The rejection is usually based on analyzing knowledge-why as knowledge of causes and defining the latter as knowing that (p because q) for some q (see, e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Pritchard 2014, Kelp 2014, Hills 2015, Sliwa 2015). Thus understood, knowledge-why amounts to knowing a single but complex proposition, which is acquired by knowing what is causally decisive.

1 For a statement and defense of skeptical invariantism see Unger (1975).
3 For virtually the same kind of debunking solution to the Gettier problem see Fogelin (1994).

4 This is at least part of the reason why some epistemologists think Gettier cases ‘inescapable’ (cf. Zagzebski (1996), Kirkham (1984) or unsolvable (cf. Floridi (2004)) for failibilist knowledge. I confess that I share their pessimist intuitions but I cannot here further belabor my pessimism.
Based on this analysis and some thought experiments, the opponents reject the reduction by arguing that understanding-why, but not knowledge-why, involves a body of interrelated propositions, comes in degrees, is immune to (some forms of) non-benign epistemic luck, and is not transmittable via testimony. Yet my goal is not to argue for or against the reduction. Instead, I show that this common analysis requires a step backwards. I argue that the common analysis of knowledge-why is insufficient, provide a better analysis, and indicate the work to be done in order to fully grasp the nature of knowledge-why and its relation to understanding-why.

My paper’s agenda comprises four steps: First, after motivating the common analysis of knowledge-why, I argue that it is insufficient. When $q$ is a simple proposition, knowing that ($p$ because $q$) is only sufficient for knowing why $p$ in a weak sense. Knowing why $p$ in a non-weak sense requires knowing how cause and effect are related. Moreover, knowledge-why is not a binary matter. Knowledge-why is gradable regarding quantity and quality. One can know why a phenomenon occurred to a greater extent or better than someone else, etc. The common analysis does not capture this aspect.

Secondly, I evaluate Greco’s (2014) and Grimm’s (2014) suggestions for a better analysis of knowledge-why. Greco proposes a neo-Aristotelian conception of knowledge of causes as knowledge of a system of dependence relations. Grimm analyzes knowledge of causes as grasping a certain modal relatedness, which requires being able to anticipate changes if things were different. I argue that both conceptions are too demanding. Such complex pieces of knowledge are sufficient but not necessary for knowledge-why (though perhaps for scientific knowledge-why).

Thirdly, I suggest that knowing why $p$ is best analyzed as knowing a correct explanation for why $p$ (inspired by Strevens 2013 and Khalifa and Gadomski 2013). When $q$ is a simple proposition, propositions of the form ($p$ because $q$) can be considered elliptically formulated explanations. Full explanations are sets of propositions which are structured in a certain way. Due to this, knowing a full explanation is a non-atomistic piece of propositional knowledge. Knowledge-why is gradable regarding quantity and quality, because for every explanandum there is more than one correct explanation and the requirements on the details and the quality of an explanation vary.

Fourthly, I indicate crucial questions to be answered in order to fully analyze the nature of knowledge-why and its relation to understanding-why.

REFERENCES
Necessary Truths, Knowledge, and E=K
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According to Timothy Williamson (2000) for any subject, one’s evidence consists of all and only one’s propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument of this sort. Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. The problem from the knowledge of necessary truths can be introduced with the help of the following reductio:

1 (E=K) For any subject S, S’s evidence is all and only the propositions that S knows.

2 (Functionality of Evidence FOE) For any subject S, for any proposition e. If e is part of S’s evidence then e is evidence for some hypothesis h.

3 (Probabilism) Prior (unconditional) probability of necessary truths is 1 (P(p)=1, where p is a necessary truth) [Kolmogorov’s 2nd axiom]

4 (Known Necessary Truths KNT) For some subject S, and some necessary truth p, S knows p (e.g. 2+2=4).

5 p (e.g. 2+2=4) is part of S’s evidence. [1, 4]

6 p (e.g. 2+2=4) is evidence for a hypothesis h. [2, 5]

7 (EV) For any subject S, for any proposition e, and for any hypothesis h, e is evidence for h for S if and only if e is part of S’s evidence and the probability of h given e is higher than the probability of h alone (i.e. P(h|e)>P(h), given that P(h)≠ 0).

8 P(2+2=4) < 1 [6, 7]

9 P(2+2=4) = 1 [3]

(1) – (9) lead to a contradiction; in order to avoid inconsistency one has to reject either (1), or (2), or (3), or (4), or (7).

Williamson (2000) is explicitly committed to (1), (3), (4), and (7). One might think that the rejection of (2) can be motivated on independent grounds, for it is possible to distinguish between the following two concepts: evidence-for-a-hypothesis (evidence-for-h) and subject’s-body-of-evidence (S’s-evidence). Once the distinction is accepted, the proponent of (E=K) may claim that, while necessary truths can be S’s-evidence, they can never be evidence-for-h.

However, giving up (2), i.e. (FOE), is problematic. Namely, the rejection of (FOE) undermines a major argument in favour of (E=K), the argument from the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence (Williamson 2000, 193-207) according to which only known propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence, and, hence, only known propositions can be one’s evidence. However, the functions that Williamson presents as the central functions of “ordinary concept of evidence” are functions of the concept of evidence-for-h (figuring in inferences to the best explanation, probabilistic reasoning/confirmation and ruling out inconsistent hypotheses); these are not functions of the concept of S’s-evidence.

Hence, if evidence-for-h and S’s-evidence are distinguished, then the argument from the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence doesn’t support E=K.

REFERENCES

How to Defend ‘Knowledge from Falsehood’
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It is a tenet of epistemology that inferential knowledge requires knowledge of all relevant premises. Assuming factivity, all such premises must be true. Several authors, however, have recently argued that contrary to the common view, it is possible for single-premise inference to yield knowledge of the conclusion even if its premise is false (Warfield (2005), Klein (2008), Luzzi (2014), Fitelson (2016)). Ted Warfield (2005) was the first to argue in favour of so-called ‘knowledge from falsehood’ (KFF) on the basis of this kind of case:

Fancy Watch: I have full confidence in the accuracy of my fancy watch, which at this moment reads 2:58pm. I thereby come to believe that it is 2:58pm. I thereby infer that I am not late for my 7pm meeting. In fact, my premise is false: it is 2:56pm, not 2:58pm. Yet I know my conclusion.

Very recently, Ball & Blome-Tillman (2014), Montminy (2015) and Schnee (2015) have all argued

1 (EV) entails that P(e) cannot be 1. See Williamson (2000, 187).
that Warfield’s cases are ultimately unsuccessful. According to them, in each apparent instance of KFF, if the conclusion-belief constitutes knowledge, then a true (and known) ‘proxy’ premise is doing the epistemic work. For example, in Fancy Watch, the subject’s alleged knowledge that they are not late for their 7pm meeting is due to the true premise ‘It is roughly 2:58pm’, which the subject dispositionally believes. Despite appearances, it is this proxy premise that epistemicizes, i.e., constitutes the epistemic basis for, the conclusion. Hence, Fancy Watch is not a case of KFF.

I argue that the proxy premise strategy fails as a response to Fancy Watch, and that therefore there is no good reason why alleged cases of KFF should not be taken at face value.

A key component of Montminy’s argument addresses the question: what makes a premise epistemicize a known conclusion? According to Montminy, only a premise that is essential can do this, in the following sense of ‘essential’: p epistemicizes a known conclusion q only if: if p were removed from S’s belief set, S would no longer know q. In Warfield’s case, the false premise that it is 2:58pm is not essential; so, Montminy argues, it cannot be the epistemic basis for the conclusion.

Anti-essentialism—the contrasting view—holds that p can epistemicize a known conclusion q even if, were p removed from S’s beliefs, S would still know q. Montminy dismisses anti-essentialism by proposing a challenge from the Gettier literature. I argue that this challenge is either question-begging against the defender of KFF, or that it can be met.

Interestingly, the anti-essentialist stance which KFF defenders must take to respond to Montminy’s challenge also provides KFF defenders with the resources to avoid the challenges leveled by Ball & Blome-Tillman (2014) and Schnee (2015). I thus advance the debate by describing the stance a defender of KFF should take to circumvent all recent attacks on KFF.

REFERENCES


Not much higher-order vagueness in Williamson’s ‘logic of clarity’
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This paper deals with higher-order vagueness in Williamson’s ‘logic of clarity’. We consider only the version of this logic that is based on fixed margin models $< W, d, \alpha >$ (cf. Williamson 1994, 279f). Without loss of generality we set the margin for error $\alpha = 1$. The metric $d$ of $< W, d, \alpha >$ is based on a reflexive and symmetric similarity relation $\sim$ related to $d$ by $x \sim y \iff d(x, y) \leq 1$. Clearly, a fixed margin model $< W, d, 1 >$ is essentially equivalent to a similarity structure $< W, \sim >$.

Formulas and operators of propositional logic are interpreted in the familiar way as subsets and Boolean operators on the set $W$. For $w \in W$ define the similarity neighborhood $\text{co}(w) := \{v \in W \mid d(v, w) \leq \alpha\}$. Define $hA$ as the set $h(A) := \{w \in W \mid \text{co}(w) \subseteq A\}$. Then $hA$ is just Williamson’s $[A]$ (Williamson (1994, 279)), to be interpreted as ‘Clearly A’. Let $PW$ denote the power set of $W$. Then the operator $h$ is a map $PW \rightarrow PW$, that takes $A$ onto $hA$. The map $h$ is distributive with respect to intersections, i.e., $\cap$.

The main novelty of our approach is based on the observation that $h$ is a component of a Galois adjunction $(h, s)$ (cf. Gierz et alii., 2003, 22).

**Definition 1.** Let $PW$ be an order-preserving map with respect to set-theoretical inclusion. An order-preserving map $PW$ is said to be Galois related to $h$ (denoted by $(h, s)$) iff

**Remark.** Let $(W, \sim)$ be a similarity structure and $(h, s)$ a Galois adjunction. Then the system $(W, \sim)$ defines a KTB-model.

**Proposition 1.** Let $h$ be map $PW$ and $s = \text{its dualbeing the set-theoretical complement}$. If $(h, s)$ is Galois adjunction then $h$ is a closure operator, i.e., for all one has $A$ and $hA = hshsA$.

**Definition 2.** Let $(W, \sim)$ be a similarity structure.
The boundary of A is defined as $bdA = hsA \cap hs\neg A$. The nth iteration of the boundary operator is denoted by $n(A) = (A)$, $n \geq 2$.

Our main result is the following:

**Theorem 1.** Let $(W, \sim)$ be similarity structure, corresponding to fixed margin model < $W, d, 1, [\ ] \rangle$. Then $(A) = (A)$, $n \geq 2$.

Williamson (1999) showed that if there is vagueness of order 2 then there will be higher-order vagueness as well. In contrast, Theorem 1 illustrates that for Williamson’s ‘logic of clarity’ there is only vagueness of order 1 and 2.

We would like to point out that the logic of clarity, sketched in this paper is characterized by models of type < $W, d, h, hs \rangle$. Compared with other accounts (Egré and Bonnay (2010), Bobzien (2015)) it may be considered as minimal and rather general in the following sense:

1. The axiom of positive introspection $hA \Rightarrow hhA$ or of negative introspection $\neg hA \Rightarrow \neg h\neg A$ need not hold for h.
2. It can be shown that the collapsing Theorem 1 also holds for variable margin models.

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**Knowledge, Pragmatic Encroachment and Social Construction**

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Some groupings of things have an underlying unity that reflects the structure of the social world. That is, some kinds are social. For instance, money is a social kind. But is knowledge a social kind? In this paper I argue for a conditional claim. If pragmatic encroachment in epistemology is true, then knowledge is a social kind.

While my claim is conditional, it has implications for mainstream analytic epistemology. Feminist epistemologists like Elizabeth Anderson (1995), Helen Longino (2002) and Lynn Nelson (1993) argue that epistemic facts cannot neatly be separated from social facts. If I am right, pragmatic encroachment in epistemology has reached the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons.

Here is a summary of the paper.

1. **Pragmatic Encroachment**
   In this section I explain what pragmatic encroachment is and why some epistemologists accept it.

   Roughly, pragmatic encroachment is the view that whether a subject S knows some proposition $p$ depends on pragmatic factors like how important it is that S is right, as well as the usual epistemic factors like how good S’s evidence is. As Jason Stanley (2005) puts it, knowledge is *interest-relative*. Two subjects with the same evidence for some proposition $p$ may differ as to whether they know $p$ due to differences in their practical interests (that is, how important it is for them that $p$ is true).

   One standard argument appeals to the connection between knowledge and action. For instance, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009) argue that if a subject S knows that $p$, then she must be in a position to treat $p$ as a reason for acting. But, they argue, what propositions a subject can treat as a reason for acting depends on her practical interests. If I really need to catch this train, I need more evidence to treat the proposition *this is the right train* as a reason for acting than I would if I didn’t have to catch this train. It follows that whether a subject knows depends on her practical interests.

   I finish with a clarification. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that knowledge depends *constitutively* on pragmatic factors. Everyone can agree that knowledge depends *causally* on pragmatic factors (if I didn’t care about $p$, I might not know it, because I wouldn’t have gathered any relevant evidence).

   2. **Social Kinds and Social Construction**
   In this section I explain what would need to be the case for knowledge to be a social kind.
I start with Sally Haslanger’s (2003) distinction between causal and constitutive social construction. Roughly, to say that something is causally constructed is to say that social factors played a causal role in its existing or being the way that it is, whereas to say that something is constitutively constructed is to say that social factors are at least partly constitutive of what it is. I focus on the constitutive social construction of facts. For instance, the fact that X is a husband is constitutively socially constructed because it holds partly in virtue of contingent social facts and arrangements.

I then say something about what social kinds are. Roughly, social kinds are groupings where the underlying basis for the unity reflects the structure of the social world. So knowledge is a social kind if the underlying basis for the unity between instances of knowledge reflects the structure of the social world. I assume that there is a unity between instances of knowledge. So the question is: what is the basis for this unity?

Finally, I argue that the basis for this unity would reflect the structure of the social world if the fact that someone knows something holds in virtue of contingent social facts and arrangements. This is just to say that knowledge is a social kind if the fact that someone knows something is constitutively socially constructed in Haslanger’s sense.

3. Knowledge is a Social Kind
In this section I argue that, if pragmatic encroachment is true, the fact that someone knows something holds in virtue of contingent social facts and arrangements.

Pragmatic encroachment is the view that epistemic facts depend constitutively on pragmatic facts. I argue that these pragmatic facts are, broadly speaking, social facts.

For instance:
- Facts about the subject’s social status or position (Harding 1991).
- Facts about the subject’s social role.
- Facts about the subject’s social values (Anderson 1995)

These facts interact with (and partly define) a subject’s ‘practical interests’. The argument then runs like this:

1. The fact that S knows that p is constitutively socially constructed if it holds partly in virtue of social facts (from Haslanger’s definition of constitutive social construction).
2. If pragmatic encroachment is true, the fact that S knows that p holds partly in virtue of pragmatic factors (=social facts).
3. So, if pragmatic encroachment is true, the fact that S knows that p is constitutively socially constructed.
4. If the fact that S knows that p is constitutively socially constructed, knowledge is a social kind.
5. If pragmatic encroachment is true, knowledge is a social kind.

I finish by mentioning some residual issues (does this mean that there can’t be knowers outside of a society? why think that pragmatic encroachment applies to all types of knowledge?), and briefly indicating how they can be resolved.

4. Pragmatic Encroachment and Relativism
In the final section I discuss one of the standard objections to the view that knowledge is ‘socially constructed’ or a ‘social kind’: that this is an objectionable sort of relativism. I consider some senses in which pragmatic encroachment might be relativistic, and argue that it is unclear why any of them are particularly problematic or objectionable.

REFERENCES
Seeing and knowing: explaining the skeptical puzzle
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One version of the skeptical puzzle is a puzzle about the following conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, perceptual knowledge seems simple and immediate. On the other hand, our evidence does not seem to favor the real world hypothesis over the skeptical hypothesis. In a first step, I will argue that this puzzle from underdetermination results from utilizing two concepts of perception. Common sense about perceptual knowledge is prima facie based on concepts of unmediated perception. According to this concept type, perception is a relation to objects in the world that is not mediated by any kind of representation. However, when the possibility of hallucination becomes salient to us we tend to shift to concepts of mediated perception that involve representations. Thus, common sense about perception switches between two types of concepts and is in this respect conceptually incoherent. The skeptical puzzle from underdetermination results from these incoherent common sense concepts concerning seeing. There is a lively debate in the theory of perception between representationalists and relationalists about the metaphysical structure of perception. Representationalism is closely connected to mediated concepts of perception and relationalism to unmediated concepts. Thus, the conceptual incoherence of common sense resembles this debate.

In a second step, I will briefly sketch that various existing solutions to the skeptical problem like externalism (see, for example, Hill 1996), dogmatism (Pryor 2000 and 2004 and Huemer 2000 and 2001) or disjunctivism (Pritchard 2012) are more or less compatible with this analysis. However, given the incoherence of common sense concerning perception, each of these theories disagrees with common sense at one point or another. The solution that corresponds best with common sense is a novel version of contextualism. This contextualism is primarily one about ‘seeing’ and derivatively one about ‘perceptual knowledge’. In ordinary contexts, we use concepts of unmediated seeing, but when confronted with the possibility of hallucinations, we switch to using mediated concepts. Accordingly, our concept of ‘knowing by seeing’ is based on unmediated seeing in ordinary contexts, but it is based on mediated seeing in skeptical contexts. This version of contextualism has strong explanatory capacity, but it also comes with high metaphysical costs, because it has to accept that in some contexts assertions are true that involve concepts of unmediated seeing whereas in other contexts assertions are true that involve concepts of mediated seeing. The moral to draw is that the source for the skeptical puzzle is a deep conceptual incoherence that we cannot easily overcome. There does not exist a coherent philosophical solution to the skeptical problem that fits with all common sense intuitions.

REFERENCES

Attributions of misunderstanding and the context-sensitivity of understanding
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Recently, Wilkenfeld (2013), Kelp (2013, 2015) and Wilkenfeld, Plunkett & Lombrozo (2016) have pointed out the context-sensitivity of understanding attributions. In Wilkenfeld's (2013) account, this context-sensitivity tracks the efficacy of inferences made possible by the possession of a certain kind of representation. In Kelp's account, it tracks the amount of knowledge required to successfully perform a task.

Here, I consider the outcome of also accounting for the context-sensitivity of misunderstanding attributions. The move is motivated by the appeal of the idea that the same kind of epistemic phenomena underlies both understanding and misunderstanding, so one would expect the context sensitivity of attributions of both kinds to go together in some sense. Someone could be tempted to account for this by modelling misunderstanding as a type of understanding, namely, understanding wrongly. This model would predict that correct
misunderstanding attributions should go together with correct understanding attributions.

However, there are cases when outright understanding attributions are not proper but misunderstanding attributions are (for example, the following seems plausible: "I did not understand; I misunderstood."). On the hypothesis that the same phenomena underlies understanding and misunderstanding, cases such as this would show that the criteria for attributing understanding and for being in the underlying state come apart. Either the underlying phenomenon is not understanding or outright attributions of understanding require more than effective understanding.

One might also want to distinguish between not understanding at all and complete misunderstanding. Acquaintance with a topic is compatible with misunderstanding, but obliviousness (as opposed to acquaintance) isn’t; conversely, obliviousness isn’t compatible with misunderstanding, but it is with a complete lack of understanding. What is lacking in obliviousness is the putative underlying phenomenon.

Briefly, I will argue that in most cases what attributions of understanding and misunderstanding track is the assessment of what I will call understanding-successes (U-successes), and not of what I will call understanding-states (U-states), which underlie the first: U-successes are U-states which satisfy a context-sensitive satisfaction condition. Attribution of U-states needs not be itself context-sensitive. I hypothesize that U-states are overabundant in comparison to U-successes, so that people are naturally biased towards tracking the latter: in most cases only them will have epistemic significance. Perhaps the appeal of seeing understanding as a species of knowledge is underwritten by a tendency towards identifying U-successes of a particular kind with understanding (cf. Pritchard 2009, 2010, 2014 and Grimm 2006, 2014). Finally, I propose that more research should be done on the nature of U-states.

REFERENCES


Knowledge, Lies and Epistemic Virtue
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Lies can have many uses. There may be pragmatic or moral reasons to lie, and psychological or evolutionary explanations for why we lie. My focus here, though, is on the epistemology of lying and on cases where lies can be used to pass on knowledge. This may sound surprising or even incoherent since lying usually involves saying something that is false. Even if a liar unwittingly tells the truth, those believing their testimony would not be seen as acquiring knowledge. I suggest, though, in §1, a range of examples where lies can be used to transmit knowledge. The kinds of cases upon which I focus are those involving “engineered knowledge”, those in which a speaker skilfully manipulates another’s thinking. §2 considers how luck relates to these cases, and §3 suggests a role for virtue theory in explaining them.

Pritchard claims that knowledge must be ‘the product of one’s cognitive abilities, such that when one knows one’s cognitive success is, in substantial part at least, creditable to one’ (2010, 51). I endorse the spirit of this condition—knowledge must be creditable to an agent—but this, I argue, need not be the knower themselves. Engineered knowledge cannot satisfy Pritchard’s interpretation of this condition given cognitive failings on the part of the
knower. Knowledge, however, is acquired in such cases and this is due to certain skills of deception on the part of the speaker. An epistemology of such cases must therefore focus not merely on the reliability of the speaker, or on the safety of the beliefs they transmit, but on their skills of deception and engineering.

Such talk of abilities and skills may suggest that a virtue epistemology is well-placed to account for engineered knowledge. Various kinds of approach are referred to as forms of virtue epistemology. One such is virtue reliabilism, according to which epistemic virtue amounts to the possession of a reliable faculty, a faculty that consistently leads to the acquisition of true belief (Sosa 2007). Such faculties include those involved in sense perception, inductive and deductive reasoning, and memory. There are, though, two problems in applying such an approach to engineered knowledge. First, virtue reliabilism focuses on the cognitive abilities and virtues of the hearer and not the speaker. Second, virtue reliabilism is one-dimensional, only focusing on the epistemic property of reliability, whereas the skills of deception required of the speaker in cases of engineered knowledge are various. He must, for example, be able to project himself into the place of another—know how she is likely to think given the lies told. His timing must be right, as must his body language. He must be creative and imaginative, and know how to adjust his scheme if the audience is resistant. The rich sets of skills required in cases of engineered knowledge may therefore suggest a kind of virtue epistemology more akin to neo-Aristotelian virtue theory, with various skills and character traits relevant to epistemic success.

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Evidentialism – For and Against
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According to evidentialism, all reasons for believing are truth-related and what one ought to believe is exclusively determined by one’s evidence, i.e. by one’s truth-related reasons. In this paper, I look at two arguments, one for and one against evidentialism. We will notice that these two arguments express ways of thinking that are, actually, compatible with one another. This compatibility will suggest that the relationship between reasons on the one hand and what one ought to believe on the other is more complex than it is usually assumed: even if all reasons are truth-related, what we ought to believe may not exclusively be determined by such reasons.

The first argument – an anti-evidentialism argument – comes from Sarah Stroud (2006). According to Stroud, the relationships in which we stand to other people influences what we ought to believe about them. Friendship, she says, involves not just affective or motivational partiality; it also influences how we ought to engage with evidence that indicates, for example, negative features of our friend’s character. When faced with such evidence, we will (a) actively think about ways to discredit it. We may (b) try to put a different spin on the evidence and interpret it in a less damning way. We can (c) link the evidence to a different character trait or (d) try to embed a negative character trait in a larger virtue or (e) develop a picture of our friend in which his or her character flaws are not salient. Her central claim is that we owe our friends more than an impartial review of the evidence: friendship requires epistemic partiality.

The second argument (see, e.g., Shah 2006) supports evidentialism by an appeal to transparency. ‘Transparency means that I must treat the practical question ‘Shall I believe that p?’ as the impersonal theoretical question about p, and this means that the reasons I may have for adopting the belief are restricted to reasons connected with the truth of p’ (Moran 1988).

Unlike with other recent critics of evidentialism, on Stroud’s view we may hold on to the idea that all reasons are truth-related. The normative commitments of friendship do not influence what counts as a reason; our normative commitments influence how we engage with truth-related reasons. When one asks how one should see one’s friend in the light of incriminating evidence, one is focussed on whatever bears on the truth of some such view. Evidence, however, leaves room for active engagement. We put various weights on the different aspects of what we know about the situation, we consider possible undermining
scenarios, we come up with alternative explanations, we interpret the evidence, and we set and apply standards and thresholds for assent. This active involvement creates the space for the influence of our various normative commitments.

Evidentialism, on the view defended here, gets only half the story right. We can be anti-evidentialists about what one ought to believe even if all reasons are truth-related. In support of this picture, I will draw on Korsgaard’s view of normativity, which emphasises that the distinctive rationality of human minds is more than a reaction to given reasons but involves the active use of our faculties, and I will relate my view to recent discussions about permissivism and pragmatic encroachment.

**Triviality for Nice Plausibilities**

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Lewis’ triviality result (Lewis 1976, Bennett 2003) is commonly held to show that conditionals have no truth value or are not propositions. More precisely, conditionals, when combined with probability, lead to trivialised conditional probabilities. The original result assumes only two premises: Stalnaker’s thesis (ST) - the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability - and the conditioning thesis (CT) - updating by a categorical evidence is conditionalisation. The proof seems to rely on probabilistic assumptions. One pressing question that arises is, whether there are non-probabilistic escape routes to triviality. Are there functional representations of degrees of belief which, although they allow for an analogue ST and CT thesis, do not lead to triviality? I show that a large class of such functions don’t. I call these functions ‘nice plausibility functions’ following a remark made by Friedman and Halpern (1995).

Decomposable plausibility measures which’s conditionalisation is determined by an invertible function (Friedman and Halpern, 1995), conditional valuation functions (Kern-Isberner 2004), possibility measures (Dubois and Prade, 1988), ranking functions (Spohn, 2012) and probabilities all fall into this category. The result also states under which conditions plausibility functions are subject to triviality, provided an analogue AT and CT thesis is assumed. There are two essential conditions on these plausibility functions. The plausibility needs to be separable (similar to ‘decomposable’ in the sense of Friedman and Halpern). This means that the plausibility of the disjunctions of incompatible propositions is a function of the plausibility of each proposition taken separately (this mimics probabilistic additivity). I call the later aggregation function. The plausibility needs to be conditionalisable. This means that the conditional plausibility of C given A exists and is a function of the joint plausibility for \( A \cap C \) and the plausibility for \( A \) (this mimics probabilistic conditionalisation). The plausibility also needs to satisfy some basic principles of updating. Additionally aggregation and conditionalisation are required to behave well with the plausibility and with each other. I argue that such a separable and conditionalisable plausibility is nice, because it nicely represents what we await from the intuitive concepts of a "conditionalisable plausibility".

Based on the general triviality result, the different main attitudes are discussed: either (1) nice plausibilities are to be abandoned or (2) CT or AT are to be dropped or (3) an expressivist stance should be adopted. I also compare my result to some of the most well known triviality results (eg. Gärdenfors 1986, 1987, Hájek and Hall 1994, Bradley 2000, 2007, Milne 2003, Hájek 1994, 2011, Charlow 2015, Fitelson 2015).

**REFERENCES**


Suspension of Judgement & Higher-Order Evidence

Thomas Raleigh, N.T.N.U.

Evidence serves not only to ground beliefs, it can also ground the agnostic attitude of suspending judgment (a.k.a. 'withholding judgement'), making it more or less justified, more or less rational. Taking this epistemic feature of suspension seriously has, I contend, implications for the metaphysics of the mental state. I will argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether \( p \) constitutes involving having a belief – more specifically, a belief about one’s evidence for \( p \) – for it is only if suspension of judgement is a species of belief that we can account for how/why it is subject to evidential norms.

I begin by distinguishing (following Friedman 2013) between 3 kinds of views as to the nature of the attitude of Suspended judgment:

- **(C R)** CREDENCE VIEW: Suspending whether \( p \) requires assigning some subjective probabilities (credences, degrees of belief) for \( p \) that fall short of outright belief in either \( p \) or in not-\( p \).
  
  See e.g. Hajek (1998), Christensen (2009).

- **(B E L - M)** META-BELIEF VIEW: Suspending whether \( p \) requires having a higher- order or meta-cognitive belief about whether one ought to believe \( p \).
  
  See e.g. Crawford (2004), Bergmann (2005), Rosenkranz (2007)

- **(S G)** SUI GENERIS VIEW: Suspending whether \( p \) requires having a ‘sui generis’ mental attitude concerning \( p \) that does not essentially involve either full or partial belief.

See e.g. Friedman (2013a, forthcoming), Sturgeon (forthcoming)

The credence view (CR) can be dismissed due to technical problems with suspending over the conjunction or over the disjunction of lots of independent propositions (Friedman 2013b). I then outline a slightly different belief-based view of Suspension:

- **(B E L - E)** EVIDENTIAL-BELIEF VIEW: Suspending whether \( p \) requires having a belief or opinion that one’s evidence does not clearly indicate either the truth or the falsity of \( p \).

I clarify how (BEL-E) should be understood and why it is to be preferred to (BEL-M). I also briefly present some considerations in favour of the following condition on Suspending judgement:

- **DOXASTIC NEUTRALITY**: Suspending whether \( p \) also requires that the subject is in a neutral doxastic state with respect to \( p \) – i.e. she neither believes that \( p \) nor disbelieves that \( p \).

However, as this requirement might be thought controversial by some, my argument will not rely on assuming doxastic neutrality for suspension.

I then consider a pair of constraints that any theory of suspension must satisfy:

- **JUSTIFICATION BY EVIDENCE**: Suspending whether \( p \) can be rendered justified or unjustified, at least to some degree, by one’s available evidence.

- **RATIONALISATION BY EVIDENCE**: Suspending whether \( p \) be rendered theoretically rational or irrational, at least to some degree, according to one’s available evidence.

Of course, the state of suspending whether \( p \) is, by definition, not committed to the truth either of \( p \) or of not-\( p \). So the question arises: how/why does one’s evidence justify or rationalise such a mental state? After all, one’s evidence does not have any such normative bearing on states such as imagining that \( p \) or hoping that \( p \), which do not essentially involve any kind of truth-commitment.
The basic problem for the sui generis view, (SG), is that it is hard to see why/how a mental state that does not essentially involve any kind of commitment to the truth or falsity of anything could be rendered more or less justified, more or less rational, by evidence – i.e. by indications that something is (or is not) the case. According to (SG), suspending whether p does not essentially involve any sort of commitment about the truth or falsity of anything. So it is left entirely unexplained how/why one’s total available evidence could provide justification/rationalisation for such a mental state.

In contrast, I argue that (BEL-E), which holds that suspension essentially involves a belief about one’s evidence, is well placed to account for how suspending judgement whether p can be rendered justified/unjustified or rational/irrational according to one’s evidence. This will be trivially so when ‘one’s evidence’ includes not only one’s evidence whether p but also any higher-order evidence of one’s evidence. But I also consider how one’s first order-evidence whether p can also, at least sometimes/often, justify/rationalise suspending whether p. I finish by discussing some of the tricky issues concerning higher-order vs. 1st order evidence as they apply to Suspension.

**Dream Skepticism and Discriminating Epistemic Grounds**

**Giovanni Rolla, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil**

The distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds (Pritchard 2015) allows us to say that we have perceptual knowledge that p (e.g. ‘there is a goldfinch yonder’) even if we cannot discriminate p from a radical skeptical possibility (e.g. that one might be a brain in a vat hallucinating that p). This is so because radical skeptical possibilities undermine all of our knowledge, so they can neither be supported nor be excluded by specific evidences – that is precisely what makes them radical. Mere favoring (non-discriminating) epistemic grounds against radical skeptical possibilities will do. On the other hand, local skeptical possibilities threaten a narrow class of believed propositions and can be reasonably motivated. E.g.: that it might be a stuffed goldfinch. If one has reasons to think that this is the case (say, there are taxidermists in this area), then one knows that p if and only if one can discriminate p from that local skeptical possibility.

I argue that the dream possibility is a moderate skeptical possibility, for it can be reasonably motivated and it threatens a large part of our knowledge, but not all of it. Thus, for a certain class of propositions, an individual has propositional knowledge if and only if she has discriminating epistemic grounds to believe that she is not dreaming. The problem can be posed as a matter of knowledge simpliciter, but its most acute version concerns our rationally grounded knowledge, the kind of knowledge that is based on available reasons. Thus we have the following dream skeptical argument:

(I) If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p then S is able to achieve rationally grounded discriminative knowledge that S is not dreaming.

(II) S is unable to achieve rationally grounded discriminative knowledge that S is not dreaming.

∴ (III) S does not have rationally grounded knowledge that p.

Premise (I) is based on a closure principle, while premise (II) is based on the thesis I call Phenomenological Conjunctivism (PC), namely: The content of S’s waking experience is phenomenologically indistinguishable from a content of S’s possible dreaming experience. In order to block (III), I evaluate (II) and PC. PC is based on the fact that, when we are dreaming, we misleadingly take oniric experiences as veridical representations of our surroundings, thus implying that we are unable to distinguish between dreaming and perceiving. Against Sosa (2007), I maintain that this construal of the fact is correct, but it does not justify PC. Therefore, (II) is unjustified. I also argue that (II) is false. I do so based on Noë’s account of perceptual consciousness (2012), according to which perception is constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor abilities in the engagement with the environment. This entails that perceiving and dreaming are phenomenologically different in fundamental aspects, thus explaining how it is possible to achieve rationally grounded knowledge that one is not dreaming and to enjoy discriminating epistemic grounds against the dream possibility.

REFERENCES
Normative Reasons Mentalism
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According to mentalism, "the things that contribute to justification are in the person's mind". (Conee and Feldman 2001, 233) But what are these "things", these reasons? Here, I defend a subjective normative reasons mentalism. It has the advantage that it uncovers important connections between internalist and externalist reasons. It can work in accord with a version of externalism and make room for an attractive disjunctivist view incorporating mentalism.

I begin by spelling out a mentalist account of propositional justification and the role that reasons, or evidence, play in it. My generic construal of mentalism is this:

(M) S has justification for a belief B iff B fits with her reasons, i.e., her mental states or contents.

Second, I elucidate distinctions from the philosophy of action between subjective normative reasons to act (considerations that, from S's perspective, speak in favor of φ-ing), objective normative reasons to act (facts that favor S's φ-ing) and explanatory motivating reasons (beliefs or desires that rationalize and explain S's φ-ing). (Lenman 2011, Schroeder 2008)

Next, I discuss three versions of mentalism that result from plugging epistemic analogues of these kinds of reasons into (M). This procedure gives us, first, Explanatory Reasons Mentalism:

(ERM) S has justification for a belief B iff B fits, on balance, with S's other mental states.

This is a traditionalist version of mentalism. I argue that it is plagued by a standard, but not necessarily fatal, problem of internalism: If B has to fit objectively with S's other mental states, there is no guarantee that S can determine whether B is true, and one main motivation for internalism is unavailable. (Bergmann 2006) But if fit as far as S can tell is all that is needed, completely unreasonable beliefs may come out as justified.

(Conee and Feldman 2008)
Combining (M) with objective normative reasons might then be more attractive:

(ONRM) S has justification for B iff S's mental states are directed at facts that, on balance, count in favor of her adopting B.

Unfortunately, this view is not internalist: It allows that mine and my demon world twin's belief differ with respect to justification because my mental states, but not my twin's, are directed at facts that favor adopting B. This problem may be solved by substituting subjective for objective normative reasons.

(SNRM) S has justification for B iff it appears to S that XYZ, where XYZ are (apparent) facts that count in favor of S’s adopting B.

Both (ERM) and (SNRM) are available to the mentalist, but (SNRM) is superior in that it allows us to move forward in the internalism/externalism debate. First, as I argue, the notion of objective normative reasons is conceptually prior to that of subjective normative reasons. Second, (SNRM) can be combined with (ONRM) into an attractive epistemological disjunctivism similar to a view defended by Hornsby (2008).

REFERENCES
Experience and Reasoning: A Challenge for the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction  
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Williamson and others recently argued against the significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Aim of the paper is to explain, defend and expand upon one of these arguments. In the first section, I will develop my understanding of a central line of argument presented in Williamson [2007]. In the second section, I will consider some replies to Williamson’s arguments by Casullo and by Jenkins and Kasaki, and I will show that they miss the structure of Williamson’s challenge. In terms of the enabling/evidential distinction, the problem can be put as follows: experience is not only required for obtaining relevant concepts or being utilized as evidence; it also plays an important role in acquiring the ability to employ those concepts properly in reasoning. If this role of experience is considered epistemically irrelevant, a priori knowledge will include a lot more than expected. If this role of experience is considered epistemically relevant, then a priori knowledge is going to be very scarce. The challenge for the defenders of the distinction is to find a way to draw it without radically revising its extension. Alternatively, they can argue for the revision of the extension of the distinction, trying to show that its original theoretical role is not (entirely) lost.

Interestingly, the two replies discussed fail in opposite directions, since they both accept (implicitly at least) a radical revision of the extension of the distinction, Jenkins and Kasaki enlarging the area of a priori knowledge and Casullo restricting it. I will then consider the view that, in cases of a priori knowledge, understanding the proposition involved provides a basis for justified belief, in the sense that one needs only the understanding and some reasoning to gain justified belief. However, such reasoning, I will argue, should be itself not dependent on experience. I will then consider, and reject, the attempt to spell out independence of experience for reasoning based on a link between the modal and epistemic status of the proposition involved, as based on a confusion between two senses of having a necessarily true belief: believing a proposition that is necessarily true and necessarily believing a true proposition. Finally, I will sketch a view of reasoning competence, drawing from work in the tradition of virtue epistemology, and I will argue that this view provides a general reason to think that the ability to reason competently is not in itself epistemically independent of experience. The main reason for the latter claim is that intellectual competences in general depend on the experiences that constitute their acquisition and development for their normative status, and the normative status of their production.

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Knowledge First Functionalism  
Mona Simion, St Andrews & KU Leuven

This paper challenges the fairly spread assumption that assertion and belief are governed by one and the same epistemic norm (the norm-commonality assumption, or NCA). It is argued that belief and assertion are governed by different epistemic norms in virtue of serving different epistemic functions. In order to do this, I start by examining the main theoretical motivations in support of the belief/assertion NCA available on the market and argue that none of them actually supports NCA. In particular, I first look at the belief/assertion parallel (employed, most notably, by Williamson 2000 and Douven 2006) and I argue that it lacks normative import. As such, even if we accept the belief/assertion parallel, it does not follow that belief and assertion need be governed by the same epistemic norm.

I move on to what I dub ‘the inheritance argument’, due to, most notably Kent Bach (2008). Roughly, Bach argues that NCA is true because belief is governed by a knowledge norm and assertion is governed by a belief norm. I argue that Bach’s picture rests on a failure of deontic transmission.

In the second part of this paper I offer reasons to believe that NCA is false, in virtue of the fact that belief and assertion serve different epistemic functions. Plausibly, the epistemic function of assertion is generating testimonial knowledge in the
hearer; uncontroversially, in the vast majority of cases, knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for reaching this goal. Therefore, asserting from knowledge is a reliable way to insure function fulfillment.

The function of belief, however, is accurately representing the world. If that is the case, I argue, the only way to make sense of a knowledge norm of belief is if what we are talking about is an evaluative norm, concerned with attributive goodness: just as a good knife is a sharp knife, a good belief is a knowledgeable belief. However, inasmuch as what we are interested in is the norm that, when respected, delivers epistemic justification, we are interested in a prescriptive, not an evaluative norm.

REFERENCES

MacFarlane’s Challenge Against Epistemic Expressivism: A Response

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The purpose of this note is to reply to the challenge that MacFarlane (2014: 192–4) raises against epistemic expressivism as defended by Chrisman (2007, 2012). Chrisman’s aim is to solve the well-established contextualist’s problem of lost disagreement. Chrisman’s way out of this problem proceeds in two steps: firstly, Chrisman adopts what Gibbard calls an oblique strategy (Gibbard 2012: 179), namely to characterize the content of epistemic ascriptions by the mental states that they express, rather than by assigning them truth-conditions. Secondly, Chrisman proposes that knowledge ascriptions express complex mental states, encompassing factual beliefs and noncognitive states of epistemic norm acceptance. According to Chrisman (2007: 241), a subject A’s utterance at context c (with epistemic standards e) of ‘S knows that p’ expresses a complex mental state comprised of:

(A1) A’s belief that S’s true belief that p meets epistemic standards e.
(A2) A’s acceptance of epistemic standards e.

On the other hand, B’s negative epistemic ascription at context c’ (with epistemic standards e’) of ‘S doesn’t know that p’ expresses:

(B1) B’s belief that S’s true belief that p does not meet epistemic standards e’.
(B2) B’s acceptance of epistemic standards e’.

By introducing the expression of a state of norm acceptance, Chrisman purports to explain the intuition that is problematic for the contextualist: that speakers making apparently contradictory epistemic ascriptions (such as A and B) disagree, even when their ascriptions are licensed by incompatible epistemic standards. In such cases, even though A and B’s utterances express compatible beliefs ¬(A1) and (B1)–, it is the acceptance of incompatible epistemic standards ¬(A2) and (B2)– which is invoked to account for the disagreement between them.

MacFarlane, however, purports to turn this explanation against the expressivist. He does this by pointing out that we can construct cases in which speakers seem to agree in their attributions of knowledge while holding incompatible epistemic standards. Consider C, who in a similar context to B (that is, with epistemic standards e’), utters ‘S knows that p’. According to the expressivist, C’s utterance expresses:

(C1) C’s belief that S’s true belief that p meets epistemic standards e’.
(C2) C’s acceptance of epistemic standards e’.

According to MacFarlane, given that the expressivist invokes the acceptance of incompatible epistemic standards in order to explain the disagreement between A and B, it seems that they should also say in this case that C disagrees with A. However, since A and C both say that S knows that p, it seems much more intuitive to say that A and C agree.

Contra MacFarlane, we aim to question the claim that speakers in structurally similar situations to A and C are intuitively best described as agreeing

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1 Authors are ordered alphabetically.
2 This is a problem for indexical versions of epistemic contextualism. For a recent overview of this and other problems of these positions, see Blome-Tillman (2015) and references therein, as well as MacFarlane (2014: 176–182).
with each other. As we will show, one can find cases in which two speakers both ascribe or deny knowledge to a subject but who can hardly be described as agreeing with each other. Speaking alike when ascribing knowledge is not sufficient for diagnosing an agreement between the speakers involved.

REFERENCES

The Generation of Knowledge from Memories
Aviezer Tucker, Harvard University

I argue that memories can be sui generis reliable basic sources for the generation of knowledge, irreducible to other sources of knowledge. I argue against preservationism, which claims that memories can only preserve knowledge generated by other types of sources, the senses (empirical), reason (a-priori), or introspection (self-knowledge) but cannot generate knowledge (Plantinga 1993; Dummett 1994, 262; Audi 1997, 410).

Memories are retrieved to generate beliefs. Lackey (2008, 251-277) showed how an agent can accept a stored memory that she previously did not believe in, proving that it is unnecessary to first know something on the basis of empirical or a-priori sources and then preserve that prior knowledge in memory, to generate knowledge from memory. Memory can form without previous knowledge if an undefeated defeater that prevented the generation of knowledge is defeated. For example, strongly held beliefs inconsistent with information embedded in a memory may block it from forming the basis for knowledge. If such undefeated defeating beliefs are expunged from a web of beliefs, for example because of new evidence, the old memory generates new knowledge. Undefeated defeaters can also be psychological, as distinct of epistemic. For example, memory of abuse by a parent during childhood may be defeated by trauma and psychological suppression. Some forms of psychotherapy promise to generate new knowledge of personal history from memories through the overcoming psychological suppressions, defeating previously undefeated defeaters.

Lackey’s argument suffices for refuting an extreme preservationist position that claims that memories can only preserve knowledge and never generate it. But a more moderate preservationist position that claims memories usually or mostly just preserve knowledge with varying degrees of reliability, except for rare cases of generation of knowledge when an undefeated defeater is defeated, can accommodate Lackey’s counterexamples. Michaelian (2011) argued that memories can generate content, new beliefs and their justifications. His reliabilist causal theory of memory takes memory to be active and constructive, generating new contents within rigid constraints. However, Michaelian did not discuss the generation of new knowledge from memories as distinct of the larger class of generation of new content from memories that also include beliefs that do not constitute knowledge. His theory therefore is more psychological than epistemic.

I argue that multiple independent memories can generate knowledge that far exceeds the sum of knowledge transmitted by the individual memories. Reliable independent memories can generate knowledge by forming a narrative or through colligation. Coherent unreliable memories and memories whose reliability cannot be ascertained can generate knowledge if and only if they are epistemically independent of each other and the prior probability of the knowledge they generate is sufficiently low. The generation of knowledge from memories faces two challenges, particular to it in comparison with the generation of knowledge from its other types of sources: Ascertaining the epistemic independence of memories, and eliminating possible confounders, events that are the common sources of coherent and independent memories about other, earlier, events. I examine how the particular difficulties in ascertaining the independence of memories and eliminating confounders can be mitigated or overcome, especially by the generation of knowledge from demonstrably independent memories in different minds, when the memories are the basic sources of
knowledge and the testimonies that report about them are trivial.

The Certainty Norm of Assertion and "Knowledge" Ascriptions
Jacques-Henri Vollet, University of Geneva

According to orthodoxy, whether a subject knows that p only depends on factors relevant to the truth of her belief. However, recently, two arguments have been put forth against this view. The first one is that our inclination to ascribe "knowledge" varies with practical factors, such as the cost of being wrong (DeRose 2009; Fantl and McGrath 2009). The second one starts from the claim that knowledge is the norm of action, and then put forth that the epistemic requirement for being rational to act on p depends on the practical situation (Fantl and McGrath 2007, 2009).

In favour of the claim that knowledge is the norm of action, various arguments have been proposed, such as the facts that we naturally and prominently use "know" for epistemic assessments of action (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), that knowledge citations are always relevant when it comes to make a practical decision, and that a subject saying "I know that p, but I should check whether p before acting" seems contradicting herself (Fantl and McGrath 2007).

Given the plausibility of the claim that the epistemic requirement on rational action varies with the practical situation, most orthodox philosophers deny that knowledge is the norm of action. However, it remains to explain why our inclinations to ascribe or deny "knowledge" sway with whether the subject (or the attributor) is in a good enough epistemic position to act on the target proposition. Some orthodox philosophers appeal to Grican implicatures (Rysiew 2001; Brown 2006), but the manoeuvre is ad hoc (DeRose 2009) and it does not explain what is wrong with the arguments in favour of the knowledge norm. Other orthodox philosophers appeal to psychological considerations, such as the fact that a belief can be shaken when high stakes are salient (Nagel 2008, 2010). However, this approach cannot explain all the cases (see Fantl and McGrath 2009).

In this paper, I propose a new orthodox approach to this problem, appealing to Stanley's certainty account of assertion (Stanley 2008). First, I defend this account in showing that it does not render most of our assertions unwarranted, in particular because certain is taken to be context-sensitive, and that it does better than the knowledge account in many respects. Second, I show that if we adopt the certainty account of assertion, we can explain in an orthodox framework why "knowledge" ascriptions shift with practical factors. In brief, if the epistemic norm of action does not require more than certainty, and given that knowledge is factive, you can assert that S knows that p only if you are in a good enough epistemic position to act on p. I show that this approach also explains what is wrong with the main arguments in favour of the knowledge norm of action.

REFERENCES

Risk with Imperfect Information
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Risk must usually be confronted with imperfect information. Decision makers may lack information about the probabilities of relevant states of the world or the utilities of possible outcomes. When this occurs, forms of probabilistic risk analysis that quantify risk as a product of the probability of an event and its magnitude (e.g., Campbell 2005) cannot be employed.

However, imperfect information does not imply no information. The inability to represent uncertainty about states and outcomes in sharp numeric terms...
does not preclude the use of interval or even qualitative terms. An arsenal of techniques has been developed to facilitate decision making under conditions of imperfect information (Kyburg 1979; Weber 1987; Kaplan 1996; Park and Kim 1997; Danielson and Ekenberg 1998; Caster and Ekenberg 2012; Bedford 2013).

The present paper aims to contribute to this arsenal by introducing techniques that are applicable at the low end of the information spectrum—that is, where information is highly imperfect. Consequently, the paper must confront two well-known problems. The *problem of absence* occurs when the relevant probabilities (Rajan 2005) or utilities (Levi 1986) are unknown or unclarified. The *problem of second-order uncertainty* arises when the relevant probabilities and utilities are available but uncertain (Freedman and Stark 2003; Aven 2008). The paper will address both of these problems in sketching a form of risk analysis that can be employed despite highly imperfect information.

**Absence**

1. The paper recalls that states of the world too imperfectly understood for probabilistic analysis can still often be characterized via non-probabilistic plausibilities (Friedman and Halpern 1995; Rott 2014).

2. Next, the paper exploits the comparative possibilities of plausibility measures. Since a plausibility measure can be defined over any partially ordered set (Halpern 2003), plausibility measures often permit us to determine that one plausibility is less than, equal to, or greater than another. This opens the door to a comparative version of decision theory. Binary choices can often be made by leveraging comparative state plausibilities and comparative outcome utilities to generate comparative plausibilistic expectations.

3. The paper then yokes comparative decision theory to risk. In keeping with both the history of the term ‘risk’ (Althaus 2005) and the recommendations of prominent risk theorists (Rosa 1998; Aven and Renn 2009; Lupton 2013), the paper takes risk to include the possibility of desirable as well as undesirable outcomes. Hence plausibilistic expectation can serve as a measure of risk.

**Uncertainty**

Given sufficient information, the problem of second-order uncertainty can be addressed in various two-dimensional ways, including probability of frequency (Kaplan and Garrick 1981), belief functions (Shafer 1976), and possibility theory (Dubois and Prade 1988). These approaches require that second-order uncertainty about numeric values be numerically expressed. Unfortunately, this is not always feasible. Hence this paper introduces what might be called a poor man’s extension of probability of frequency. When poor information prevents numerical representation of second-order uncertainty, qualitative plausibilities can often do the trick. Many (though not all) of the resulting expressions are comparable. They can therefore serve as inputs for comparative decision theory.

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Risks

To serve as inputs for comparative decision theory.
Robot Testimony  
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Today much of what we know depends on the information-processing of computers, machines and other mechanical devices. Typical examples include the use of internet search engines, smart phones and GPS-enabled navigation aids. Our epistemic dependency on machines is only likely to increase in the future with the arrival of ‘social robots’—robots that can communicate and collaborate with humans in something like normal everyday social environments. It has been predicted that healthcare, education and the service industry, are all likely to be transformed by social robotics over the coming decades (European Commission, 2016). This raises an important question concerning the nature of the epistemic dependence between humans and robots: is knowledge formed on the ‘say-so’ of a robot instrumental (in a way analogous to beliefs formed through observing a clock or using a calculator) or is it testimonial (more akin to beliefs formed through being ‘told-so’ by a human)? The debate is not only terminological. Testimony is an important factor in social epistemology and often taken to provide the criteria for membership into a social group as an epistemic unit. Likewise, whether a robot provides testimony has implications for the ‘extended mind hypothesis’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) and versions of ‘extended knowledge’ (Goldberg, 2010; Pritchard & Palermos, 2013) where the epistemic properties of a hearer’s belief extend to processes beyond their own cognitive states.

In this talk I argue that beliefs formed on the basis of the say-so of some groups of machines should be classified as testimony. I begin by considering three counter-arguments to the claim that testimony can be provided by anything less than cognitively mature human agents. The first is given by Sanford Goldberg (2012) who argues that testimony is unique to sources which are themselves subject to normative epistemic appraisals. The second comes from Stephen Wright (2014) who claims that testimony is distinctive because the hearer can depend on either the reliability of the speaker or on the speaker’s justification. The third consideration comes from definitions of testimony which suggest intentional states are a necessary component in testimony, something which machines arguably lack.

It will be shown that all three arguments suffer a number of problems. Instead, I tentatively suggest that whether or not a source of knowledge counts as testimonial depends largely on facts about the receiver. In addition, the distinction is not an epistemic one but a psychological one and relies upon the perception of certain psychological cues which illicit a ‘trust response’ (Sosa, 2006) in the hearer. I build on results in experimental psychology from Gray, Gray & Wegner (2007) and Sytsma & Machery (2010) which show there is a stable set of mental capacities which are not perceived in social robots. Since many of the capacities which are perceived in robots are those needed to illicit the ‘trust response’, a case can be made for thinking that social robots will be perceived to give testimony and are therefore testimonial sources of knowledge.

REFERENCES
Replacement and Reasoning – A Reliabilist Account of Epistemic Defeat
Jan Wieben, University of Cologne

Intuitively, acquiring a defeater renders the defeated belief unjustified: John believes that the wall in front of him is red, based on his experience of a red wall. If he then receives the information that a red lamp behind him illuminates the wall with red light, he is no longer justified in believing that the wall is red. It is thus unsurprising that the possibility of defeat has been widely accepted in epistemology (e.g. Goldman 1979; Pryor 2004; Bergmann 2006; Lackey 2008; Grundmann 2011). Also accepted by most philosophers is John Pollock’s distinction between rebutting defeaters, which attack the defeated belief directly, and undercutting defeaters, which attack the justification for that belief (Pollock 1974). From this arise two tasks for any theory of justification: first, it must be explained how the two types of defeaters work to destroy justification in their distinctive ways. Second, that explanation must be integrated with the general analysis of epistemic justification, such that intuitions about defeat are accommodated.

This is especially difficult for standard reliabilism, given that on the one hand intuitions about defeat stem from the feeling that ignoring defeaters would be irrational and rationality is not a condition on reliabilist justification, while on the other hand, reliabilism is a genetic theory of justification (Goldman 1979). Thus, all factors that are relevant for justification lie in the past and cannot be affected by obtaining a defeater in the present. I argue that epistemic defeat can nevertheless be integrated with reliabilism through a principle I call replacement.

The idea is that when a defeater is obtained, an incompatibility between the doxastic attitude recommended by the defeater and the defeated belief arises. This initiates a reasoning process, which contains both of the involved propositions, as well as considerations about their respective epistemic support. It compares the degrees to which the competing attitudes are supported and replaces the original justification process for the defeated belief. This, I argue, is what it means to re-evaluate a belief. If the process is reliable, it will result in the agent giving up the defeated belief and retaining the defeater. Since it can be established that only rational reasoning processes are reliable, replacement does justice to intuitions about defeat.

What is more, reliabilism needs to provide the resources to differentiate between good and bad reasoning processes and to enable justified belief revision in response to good reasoning, independently of considerations about defeat. Therefore, replacement can be seen as an explication of, rather than an addendum to reliabilism. Also, since higher-order considerations about the support for the conflicting propositions are part of the reasoning process, the principle allows for the reconciliation between the plausible view that undercutting defeaters defeat by generating higher-order incompatibilities (Sturgeon 2012; Mellis 2014) and reliabilism.

REFERENCES

1 See Goldman (1979) and Grundmann (2009) for examples of extending attempts.
Willful Ignorance
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Consider the following case: Will is a tourist, and when he is about to leave for his holiday destination a stranger offers him $2000 to deliver a suitcase abroad. The stranger looks friendly, and although Will suspects that something might be wrong with the contents of the suitcase, he keeps himself willfully ignorant by not asking any questions. He tells himself that it might well contain gifts for the stranger’s family and accepts the offer. Unknown to him, the suitcase contains weapons. Noah is very similar to Will, and receives and accepts the same offer, though in contrast to Will he does ask about the contents of the suitcase, and knows full well he is transporting weapons.

Thus, Noah knows what he is doing. By contrast, Will does not know what he is doing. He merely suspects that his conduct might be wrong. He does know that he could inform himself better, but willfully avoids doing so. The question is: who is more blameworthy? On the one hand, Noah seems more blameworthy given that he knows what he is doing. On the other hand, Will seems no less blameworthy, since he could easily inform himself better and knows he could do so. Thus, is Noah more blameworthy than Will? Or are Noah and Will blameworthy to the same degree?

In many legal systems, the latter view is accepted. At least when it comes to transporting drugs, one’s willful ignorance will provide no excuse and does not mitigate one’s blameworthiness. Husak & Callender (1994) have dubbed this the ‘equal culpability thesis’ (ECT). One may wonder, however, why ECT should hold. Given that legal practice depends on it, the issue has obvious importance. Interestingly enough, ECT has hardly been defended in the literature. A recent exception is Alexander Sarch (2014), who defends a restricted version of it. On Sarch’s view, ECT is true whenever willfully ignorant agents incur additional blameworthiness for their ignorance.

This paper proposes an alternative to Sarch’s account, according to which ECT is true whenever the motives of willfully ignorant and knowing wrongdoers are equally bad (where the badness of motives is determined in a counterfactual way). The plan of the paper is as follows. First, I’ll provide an epistemological analysis of the concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘willful ignorance’, and show where they come apart. Next, I’ll discuss Sarch’s proposal. Finally, I’ll set forth and defend my alternative account.

Disjunctivism and the Epistemology of Testimony
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Epistemological disjunctivism is most commonly discussed in terms of perceptual knowledge. According to epistemological disjunctivism, in a paradigm case of perceptual knowledge, a subject’s knowledge can be grounded in a reason that is both and to her. In discussing epistemological disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard makes the following suggestive comment:

It may well be possible to offer a variant of epistemological disjunctivism which is applicable to knowledge in general (Pritchard, 2012, p. 13).

The idea that as a source of knowledge might place a distinctive constraint on theories of knowledge in general is widely discussed. With this in mind, this discussion investigates a disjunctivist theory of knowledge from testimony. There will be three main parts. In the first, I will identify the elements of a disjunctivist theory of knowledge from testimony. In the second, I will identify the place of testimonial disjunctivism in the landscape of and theories. In the third, I will respond to arguments that purport to falsify testimonial disjunctivism.

There are three elements to testimonial disjunctivism: a claim about the factive reason that grounds a listener’s knowledge in a paradigm case of testimonial knowledge, a claim about why this reason should be thought to be reflectively accessible to the listener and a claim about what the paradigmatic case in which the listener’s knowledge is grounded in this way looks like. According to the version of testimonial disjunctivism I develop, the factive reason that grounds a listener’s knowledge is the fact that she that things are a certain way. The argument that this is reflectively accessible to the listener can be translated directly from disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. And the paradigmatic case is one in which the speaker’s
testimony expresses her knowledge of what she says and the listener is not in believing the speaker.

Existing discussions of the disjunctivist theory of testimony given by John McDowell (1994) identify it as a traditional theory. I argue that testimonial disjunctivism has more in common with a traditional approach and that there are significant disagreements between the spirit of disjunctivism and the spirit of anti-reductionism. Testimonial disjunctivism is, I argue best characterised as distinct from a paradigmatic example of either reductionism or anti-reductionism.

Lastly, I defend testimonial disjunctivism against three arguments from Jennifer Lackey (2008) and Paul Faulkner (2011). The first two are general arguments against anti-reductionism, since both Lackey and Faulkner characterise testimonial disjunctivism in anti-reductionist terms. I argue that disjunctivism's distinctive features allow for these arguments to be met. Lastly, I consider an objection from Faulkner that takes aim at the distinctively disjunctivist spirit of testimonial disjunctivism. Faulkner objects that lies can be subjectively indistinguishable from expressions of knowledge and that testimonial disjunctivism lacks the resources to accommodate this. Whilst this is plausible, I show that this argument can be met.

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Abstraction and Epistemic Fundamentality
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Wright (2004), (2004b) claims that epistemic entitlement, unlike epistemic justification, requires, (1), that the subject have no sufficient reasons to think that P is untrue, and, (2), that the attempt to justify P involve "further presuppositions in turn of no more secure prior standing, and so without limit". As illustrative examples, Wright claims that we are entitled to assume that our cognitive functions are working properly (Wright, 2004: 189) and that the cognitive environment is epistemically cooperative (Wright, 2004b: 164). Furthermore, Wright claims that we are entitled to 'bet on' the validity of basic logical laws, since, (a), we lack, characteristically, any reason to think that they are invalid; and, (b), the attempt to demonstrate their validity would rest on presuppositions of the same general sort - typically, the presupposition of the validity of those laws themselves.

Wright (forthcoming) contends that "the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference". Aim of this contribution is (i) to discuss Wright's application of the notion of epistemic entitlement in the philosophy of mathematics (ii) by pointing out that, whereas the best examples of entitlements are such that the very same presuppositions are required for the justification of those presuppositions themselves – that there is an external world, for example; or that I am not in the grips of a mauvais génie; or that Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference –, 'bad company' – viz., the fact that many abstraction principles are unacceptable - is a relevant difference between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of abstraction.

REFERENCES

Knowledge First and Disjunctivism
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1. Despite his explicit disavowal of epistemological disjunctivism in his Knowledge and Its Limits (Williamson 2000), Timothy Williamson is still occasionally recognized as a proponent of this idea
(Crane 2006, Brueckner 2009). Williamson is well aware that these mistakes are not merely accidental, since he later wrote this: ‘[t]o a first approximation [...], disjunctivism about perception is simply knowledge first epistemology as applied to perception.’ (Williamson 2011, p. 216). Then he explains why knowledge first epistemology is nevertheless different from disjunctivism.

2. The aim of this paper is to show that Williamson’s refusal of disjunctivism is based on a misunderstanding. There is a way to merge knowledge first epistemology with both epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism. And there are good reasons for doing it: if endorsed together, these views are significantly more resistant to criticism.

3. Williamson rejects disjunctivism on the grounds that (A) it is committed to the claim that perception and hallucination have nothing mentally in common and that (B) analyzing the concept of sense experience in terms of disjunction leads to a formally incorrect classification of experiences (Williamson 2000).

4. However, (A) is simply not true (cf. e.g. Crane 2006, McDowell 2013, Snowdon 2009). (B), in turn, falls short of its target: the claim currently known as ‘disjunctivism’ not only has ‘nothing essentially to do with disjunction’ (Snowdon 2005, pp. 136-137), but it cannot even be properly expressed with the use of this logical connective. The idea that ‘disjunctivism’ stands for is the following: perception and hallucination are different with regard to some fundamental respect, and this difference holds even in cases where these experiences are subjectively (phenomenally) indistinguishable. Epistemological disjunctivism claims that this difference concerns epistemic significance, while under metaphysical disjunctivism the difference is concerned with intrinsic nature of experience. I argue that this thought can be properly expressed in terms of alternative denial (a.k.a. Sheffer stroke, a logical connective equivalent to negation of conjunction). Analyzing sense experience in terms of alternative denial commits one to a typology of experiences. Formal correctness standards for typologies are lower than those for classifications. Therefore, although (B) is a problem for disjunctivism, it is not a problem for alternative-denialism.

5. If I am correct, the knowledge first epistemology after all is, in some broad sense, a version of epistemological alternative-denialism (a.k.a. epistemological disjunctivism). That there is no inconsistency here can be already seen in the epistemology of Alan Millar (see e.g. Millar 2010). Moreover, metaphysical alternative-denialism (a.k.a. metaphysical disjunctivism) really is ‘knowledge first epistemology as applied to perception’.

6. The reason for endorsing the whole package of the above-mentioned views is that they are mutually supportive. Metaphysical alternative-denialism equips knowledge first epistemology with strong solutions to the screening-off problem in philosophy of perception (Martin 2006) and to numerous post-Gettier puzzles, whereas knowledge first epistemology avoids the problem that JTB-varieties of epistemological alternative-denialism have with the hyper-intellectualisation objection (cf. e.g. Kelp & Ghijsen 2016).

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